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What is ethics education or training

by Simon Longstaff

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to outline some of the conceptual and practical concerns that attach to the idea of ethics education or training. It is particularly significant that the editor of this book thought to specify the topic for this chapter in a way that refers to both education and training. It will be argued below that, although the distinction is sometimes thought to be irrelevant, in this case (at least) it is of essential importance.

Moving from this point it is argued that an effective response to the challenge of developing or reinforcing sound ethical dispositions and behaviour will depend on the adoption of mutually reinforcing programmes of education and training.

It should be noted that these arguments proceed from a position that could be broadly described as 'Aristotelian' in character. Having gestured in Aristotle's direction at the outset, there will be no attempt made to offer a thorough exegesis of Aristotle's arguments. Rather, the practical implications of Aristotle's position will be drawn out against a general philosophical background.

Before proceeding to the main arguments of this chapter, it may be useful to explore the context in which the discussion is to be placed. In the first instance this will require some account of the significance that is currently attached to the topic of ethics. Following this, there will be a brief attempt to answer the question, “What is ethics?”.

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Current significance

Despite being a perennial concern, there has probably been no other time in history when the topic of ethics has been so obviously or widely debated in the private and public arenas of social discourse. But why should this be so? Four possible factors affecting the situation deserve attention.

Public cynicism about the institutions of society

Some suggest that the current level of concern about ethics can be linked to a reaction against what have come to be known as ‘the excesses of the ’80s’. On such an account, there is a need to see the debate about ethics against a background of popular concern about whether or not society's institutions are entitled to the trust and respect that they once commanded - almost as of right. To point to a sense of public cynicism is but one approach. As Sir Max Bingham (1992, p.1) observed in his QUT Annual Ethics and Public Life Lecture:

The Fitzgerald Report depicted circumstances that prevailed in Queensland in 1989. It was a fairly unhappy set of circumstances, including not only the obvious cases of corruption, but also other matters. Not only the police and politicians, but the whole institutional system came under close examination, and Fitzgerald painted a picture of a society in which development was pre-eminent, and the catch cry was 'get it done', with the result that as one commentator observed, "history was being made too fast". While the more obvious symptoms of the malaise - the cutting of corners and the bending of rules - were depicted in the Fitzgerald Report, there were nevertheless other side-effects which attracted less publicity.

Similar problems in other States shocked and bewildered many Australians.

While the public sector had its well publicised difficulties, one should remember that many of the activities causing greatest public concern were played out within institutions regarded as the 'pillars' of the private sector.

While recognising that the level of 'bank bashing' is frequently disproportionate to the level of wrong-doing, there is justice in the perception that some banks seemed to disregard the interests of their customers with a breath-taking degree of selfishness and arrogance.

The same holds good for a number of professions. Recent research published in Time Australia indicates that the public's rating of the 'Ethics/Honesty' of lawyers continues to fall. Many other institutions find themselves in the same predicament. The medical profession is under attack, politicians are treated with suspicion and those in business are generally believed to treat ethics as an ‘optional extra’.

The upshot of this is that to talk about ‘ethics’ may be a short-hand way of pointing to the need for someone to do something to either renew the foundations for trust or provide a framework of regulation and surveillance that makes trust a strictly unnecessary commodity. It should be noted that virtually no-one who has thought about the problem of how to rescue these institutions from the mire of opprobrium would advocate the latter approach.

A reaction of the 'guilt' reflex

It could be argued that all of the concern about ethics is really the expression of a kind of hypocritical self-righteousness that arises from the combination of a latent sense of popular guilt combined with the need to find a scapegoat. According to this argument, ordinary people are seen to use their concern about ethics as a way to re-direct attention away from their personal assessment about the failures (rather than the excesses) of the 1980s.

The former head of the National Companies and Securities Commission (the Australian Security Commission's predecessor), Henry Bosch, has made the telling point that although there are some well-publicised cases of corporate excesses and wrong-doing, it would be dishonest to pretend that these incidences were isolated or unique in their character. Although there were some who obviously held centre stage, they in turn were supported by a ‘cast of thousands’.

Bosch's point draws attention to the fact that much of what is now condemned could not have occurred without the active participation of certain groups of lawyers, accountants, valuers and so on, who abandoned the notion that their professional status was crucially (if only partially) defined by reference to their being motivated by a spirit of public service, in favour of a purely commercial imperative to sell their services to the highest bidder.

Once again, it was not just a few professional advisers who seemed to participate in the events that are now condemned. Ordinary members of the community seemed to offer the sincerest form of flattery - by imitating and lionising those who have now been rejected. It is sometimes hard to resist the thought that much of the public indignation directed against fallen entrepreneurs stems from the fact that they were observed to fail. Perceptions of unethical behaviour may only be an incidental matter of concern. Or to put it another way, would the ethics of such people be open to question if their plans had succeeded?

It should be stressed that this comment is not offered as some sort of apology for the behaviour of such discredited figures. Rather, the reason for making this point is to suggest that another reason for a popular concern with ethics may lie in the fact that the public dimly recognises the need to address a set of issues and concerns that people recognise as having a bearing on their own conduct.

The need for certainty

A third possible factor generating contemporary interest in ethics may lie in an observation made by the Australian social researcher, Hugh Mackay. Mackay argues that the ‘nervous ‘90s’ are very much the legacy of a period stretching forth from the early 1950s. He makes the point that the intervening years have been the back-drop for a process of constant change at an ever-increasing rate. One of the effects of this change has been a rise in the level of anxiety.

Mackay suggests that many Australians crave a straw of certainty that might be grasped in the maelstrom of contemporary times. This desire for certainty expresses itself in the form of a search for fundamental values. In turn, people are led into the realm of ethics (even if they do not explicitly label their new terrain as such).

The perceived link between ethics and 'best practice'

A fourth basis for directing attention to the question of ethics may lie in current thinking about the importance of managing values as part of a conscious drive to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of institutions.

For example, the proponents of Total Quality Management (in its fully developed and sophisticated form) predicate their ability to sustain improvements in productivity on a transformation of the ethos of the workplace away from rigid hierarchy and towards structures of co-operation. As with wider society, so corporations and public sector organisations are having to learn how to maximise the positive aspects of change. Current thinking suggests that such circumstances call for the application of skills of leadership (as opposed to simple management). From this observation flows a recognition of the need to develop a capacity to engage with questions of values as they impinge upon the lives of colleagues.

So to summarise, there are at least four factors accounting for why the topic of ethics might be a matter for so much current attention:

1. Public cynicism about the institutions of society
2. A reaction of the 'guilt' reflex
3. The need for certainty
4. The perceived link between ethics and 'best practice'

Two further points should be made. The first of these is that all four factors (as outlined above) are likely to be effective in society at the same time. They are not mutually exclusive (nor do they exclude the possibility of other unstated reasons). The second point is that these factors need to be examined at both the macro and micro levels. That is, those seeking to understand the dynamics associated with the ethos of an organisation (such as exists across the public service) will need to see how such factors affect individuals in their relationship to the organisation and its developing ethos.

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What is ethics?

It is sometimes surprising that, for all the attention currently being paid to the subject of ‘ethics’, there is so little fundamental understanding of what ‘ethics’ is all about.

This lack of understanding seems to continue despite (or is it because of?) the fact that dictionary definitions are offered on a regular and frequent basis. Such definitions usually tell the keen enquirer that ethics is the science of morals, or the study of ‘good’ and ‘evil’, ‘right’ and ‘wrong’. While such definitions must be taken as strictly correct, they seem to miss the opportunity to provide a slightly deeper understanding of the matter. That which follows may be a little idiosyncratic in its formulation. However, it provides a reasonable point of access for those who wish to come to grips with the practical aspect of ethics.

Some people hold the view that ‘ethics’ is first and foremost, a realm of theory and arcane formulations. It is a matter of regret that some philosophers have reinforced this misconception. Others hold that ethics is the same as morality. Those holding this view sometimes make a further (strictly unrelated) claim. This is that morality is a personal (and therefore private) matter for individuals. While both general points are understandable, they are open to the challenge that they are based on a mistake.

In order to see the nature of this mistake one needs to consider the origin of the debate about ethics as it evolved in the Occident. This chapter is limited in its construction by an ignorance of the founding questions in Oriental ethics, so all further discussion must be presumed to be about the Western tradition.

Ethics is a matter of practical concern

The ancient Greek philosopher Plato records his predecessor Socrates as having asked the fundamental question of ethics, "What ought one to do?". Whenever one seeks to answer that question, then one is operating in the ethical dimension.

There are a number of things that should be noted about this question. The first thing to note relates to what Socrates did not ask! Socrates did not begin by asking questions such as, "What is good, what is evil?' or, "What is right, what is wrong?". Rather, he asked an immensely practical question that confronts people whenever they have a decision to make, whenever they are in a position to exercise their capacity to choose. Socrates did not mark off a special area which was to be the terrain for ethical reflection. His question is far more troublesome to people because it is impossible to escape.

Some people have trouble seeing that this question has anything to do with ethics. They feel that the area of concern should be far more tightly circumscribed. By way of supporting their contention that the ethical question can be evaded, they challenge the Socratic position by asserting that there are many types of decision that are made without reflection.

In response to the question, "Why did you do that?", the reply is made, "Because it seemed like a good idea at the time" or, "Because that is the way we always do it around here!".

"What has that got to do with ethics?' they ask. This seems to be a good question. However, Socrates was a notoriously slippery customer and he would probably counter with another set of questions such as, "Why does the fact that 'it seemed like a good idea at the time' provide sufficient reason for doing anything?". And similarly, "What is so compelling about the reason that something should be done because 'that is the way things are done around here'?".

It is not just that Socrates (like most philosophers) liked asking questions. For Socrates (and for subsequent proponents of his question), the force of his original question lies in the fact that it demands some sort of account from people as to why they choose one good over another. In fact, at its deeper level, Socrates' question requires people to articulate some sort of founding vision about what they consider to be a ‘good life’.

One can see the question at work on what, at first sight, seems to be quite a mundane level. Suppose that a person has to decide a question to do with the way in which they will spend a Saturday afternoon. Let us suppose (in a quite artificial way) that their choice is limited to either spending time with the family or going to the football. The person asks, "What ought I do?' (the proper practical formulation of the more general question).

In answering this question the person will have to make an assessment of what he or she values. Is a 'good life' one in which a person meets reasonable family expectations, or does it involve displaying loyalty to a team, or friends or whatever else defines a sense of the worth of attending the game? As will be seen, it doesn't take too many moves before one is grappling with complex questions of loyalty, filial piety, friendship and so on. Having said this, one might reconcile the apparent dilemma by taking the family to the game!

None of this is meant to be read as if advocating a set of circumstances in which each and every question cum choice is to be taken as an occasion for deep ethical reflection. Should such a prescription be applied it would probably lead to a kind of paralysis where action became improbably difficult. Fortunately, there is an alternative which allows for both action and a framework for making decisions that is based on adequate ethical reflection. This alternative will be discussed in later sections.

Ethics is not the same as morality

The other position that needs to be addressed is that which holds that ethics "is the same as morality". The distinction can be demonstrated by using the analogy of a conversation. If one imagines that the field of ethics is a conversation that has arisen in order to answer the question, “What ought one to do?”, then moralities (and they are various) are voices in that conversation. Each voice belongs to a tradition or theory that offers a framework within which the question might be contemplated and answered. So there is a Christian voice, a Jewish voice, an Islamic voice, Buddhist voice, Hindu voice, Confucian voice and so on. Each voice has something distinctive to say - although they may all share certain things in common.

There are, in addition to the moralities that flow from the world's religions, the voices that represent the various attempts to found moral systems on the thinking of philosophers. Examples such as Utilitarianism and Kantian Formalism provide clear examples of philosophical theories that can give rise to moralities (so understood).

Just as there are many shared ethical perspectives to be found in religions, so there is much that is common to the approaches adopted by the philosophers in their attempts to answer Socrates' founding and persistent question. This is not the place to go into an analysis of ethical theories except to say that, in common with all such theories (whether sacred or secular in their origin), they fail to give an absolutely 'foolproof' guide to behaviour. No ethical theory or morality (from the West) has found a way to answer Socrates' question in a way that totally avoids the countless ethical dilemmas that seem to be a persistent feature of what might be called the ‘ethical landscape’.

One simple example may suffice as an indication of the type of dilemma that might be encountered. Most people would agree (possibly for quite different reasons) that people ought to tell the truth. These same people will hold that one ought to avoid causing harm. But what happens when to tell the truth will cause another person harm? Both principles seem to be valid on their own account, but when put in combination with other values an irreconcilable tension may arise.

This is not a trivial point. It tells of something that is absolutely crucial when trying to come to terms with the central question to be addressed in this chapter. It is part of the argument that is to be advanced below that the shape and relationship between ethics education and training needs to address the apparently unavoidable phenomenon of the ethical dilemma.

A final point about ethics

Much of the above has been based on the discussion of what have been presented as either mistaken or incomplete conceptions of a field of inquiry called ‘ethics’.

However, in all this discussion one crucial point has been left unsaid. This is that ethical considerations involve an essential social element. Whether one seeks to move from religious conviction, or from a position in which one seeks to generate consequences in which pleasure is maximised and pain minimised (or some other more sophisticated version of Utilitarianism), or from the point of view in which other persons are seen as being members of the ‘kingdom of ends’, the result is the same - a consideration of ethical questions involves a consideration of the quality and nature of relationships with other people.

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A brief summation

It may be useful to pause a moment to see where this attempt to understand the background to this chapter's central question has brought us. The design of a programme of ethics education/training will need to take into account the concerns of those who are 'driving' the process: community concerns about the trustworthiness of public institutions, the need to be seen to take remedial action to prevent the frequently repeated errors of the past, a recognition that attention to ethics may assist organisations in realising their ends.

At the same time the programme will have to develop a number of skills, capacities and dispositions in a way that allows for a type of ethical reflection and action that is effective in the realm of practice.

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Ethics education/training

As noted above, it is the contention of this chapter that there is a distinction between ethics education and ethics training. The bases for this distinction lie in two observations. The first of these depends upon an understanding of how people develop their sense of the ethical. The second basis relates to a pragmatic concern about what is likely to work when developing a programme.

There are a number of immediate questions that might be asked when considering the general question of ethics education/training. The first of these might be, "Can ethics be taught?". It is argued below that the answer is a conditional, "Yes". But as is the case in so many of these debates, it all depends on what is meant by the terms 'education' and 'training'.

Ethics training:

For the purpose of the following discussion let it be understood that by 'ethics training' is meant those processes and experiences which are designed to impart knowledge, understanding and skills to people in order that they might share in the task of maintaining an organisation's ethos.

Ethics education:

For the purpose of the following discussion let it be understood that by 'ethics education' is meant those processes and experiences which are designed to impart knowledge, understanding and skills to people in order that they might autonomously and authentically develop and maintain an ethical framework that is their own.

The force of the distinction

Some may regard the proposed distinction as being either unnecessary or unduly precise. The key to the distinction is a recognition of the need to assist people to develop their capacities for ethical reflection to an extent sufficient for them to make the rules they follow into their own.

This is not to suggest that there will be different ethical frameworks competing against each other in the one organisation. There is every reason to suppose that colleagues will come to share similar (or mutually supportive) positions. The potential differences will lie in the maturity of each person's sense of the ethical.

If ethics education is designed to foster the development of moral autonomy (albeit within a social setting), ethics training is designed to impart knowledge and skills sufficient to ensure that the organisation's values are reflected in the behaviour of its members.

There will be a number of sources from which an organisation's values will flow. One source will be the traditions (manifest as customs and practices) that frequently operate at a level that is seldom open to conscious examination. Deliberate policy decisions provide an additional source of values. They may reinforce or amend custom and practice. In either case, there is a complex interaction of influences that are ultimately expressed as both formal and informal institutional arrangements of people, processes (including control systems), information and so on.

Ethics training will typically involve exercises such as the dissemination and discussion of an organisation's Code of Ethics and/or Code of Conduct (quite different documents, as explored in chapter 13 of this book). This is not to say that training should aim at compliance without understanding. As the training process unfolds there will be a natural blurring of the boundary with ethics education. Hence, the possibility that some may want to deny the validity of the distinction from the outset.

But even if one accepts (as one ought to) that training requires the development of a capacity to reflect on what one does and the fostering of certain dispositions, the focus of ethics education will be significantly different. This will become more evident when an Aristotelian model of development is briefly discussed below.

Some might argue that even if the distinction is allowed, there will be little reason to promote ethics education as most of an organisation's objectives (and society's concerns) could be met by ethics training. So why take the additional step that has the potential to cause division between people?

Why bother with ethics education?

There are a number of reasons for wanting to do this. Some of these reasons are based on ethical principles that cannot be either debated or justified in this paper. As with any set of principles, they are open to question. However, in order to advance the argument, they are simply stipulated.

The first reason for fostering the conditions for autonomous moral agency flows from the principle of respect for persons. In this case, the principle suggests that it would be wrong to treat people simply as means to another person's (institution's) ends. The development of even a benevolent ethos based on a conscious policy of indoctrination would be to breach the principle of respect for persons.

In some formulations, the principle of respect for persons can be linked to the demand for individual liberty. According to this principle, it is considered wrong to compel a person 'to do or forbear' from doing something - even if this may be in the person's own interest. In other words, one ought to respect the rights of people to make their own moral decisions. As John Stuart Mill (1991, p.6) argued:

A person cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, because in the opinion of others to do so would be wise, or even right. These are good reasons for remonstrating with him, or reasoning with him, or persuading him, but not for compelling him, or visiting him with any woe in case he do otherwise ... Over himself, over his own body and mind the individual is sovereign.

There is, however, an open question (and an ambiguity in Mill's own position on the compulsory education of children) as to whether or not some sort of training in order to support an institution's ethos (sometimes expressed through rules) is to be allowed.

The second reason for promoting autonomy flows from the argument that autonomous individuals (who have internalised the ethical principles that inform the conduct of their lives) are more likely to be consistent and reliable in the application of these principles. Of equal importance will be their ability to cope with genuinely novel circumstances that they might encounter from time to time.

Thirdly, autonomous moral agents will not only have settled convictions and dispositions, they will also be able to review the principles that they adhere to as circumstances change.

Finally, autonomous moral agents will be less likely to sacrifice ethical considerations on the altars of expediency or materially rewarding impropriety.

Having said this, it is argued that the development of the autonomous moral agent proceeds from an earlier stage of development where training plays a vital role. This is to suggest that training can play a part in providing experiences that are specifically oriented towards the end of reinforcing the ethos of a particular organisation. Hence the content of training will be based on and include the values and rules that define the organisation's distinctive approach to the management of its constituent relationships.

The basic distinction is that ethics training will focus on the character of the organisation while ethics education will focus on the character of the individual.

The link between ethics education and training

There are a number of well known theories of how moral development proceeds. All theories posit a number of stages that are passed through as a normal part of development as a human being. All theories accept the possibility that the rate of development may be different for different individuals, and all accept that some people may 'fail' to progress from one stage to the next. It is suggested that these common features hold even in circumstances where a 'masculine' form of rationality is not privileged as an indicator of 'progress'.

One of the best known of these theories is that developed by Kohlberg (as a variation of Piaget's theory of child development). Kohlberg's theory need not be outlined in any detail at this point. It is enough to observe two things; firstly that Kohlberg posits a final stage of post-conventional morality and that his is a theory almost exclusively concerned with cognitive development. That is, as Tobin (1989a, p15) shows, Kohlberg concentrates on the development of a conceptual framework (forms of reasoning on how to act) without giving an account of the role of "feelings and modes of responsiveness to the world' (the affective) or the ways in which thoughts about how one should act are effectively translated into ordinary conduct (the conative).

This deficiency is rectified in the later work of RS Peters, who offers a more complete theory of moral development in which the cognitive is supported by the affective and conative. Once again there is no need to go into the details, except to say that Peters' final stage is one in which a person reaches a stage of 'reasonableness' and becomes the person of 'rational morality' who has "made a code of behaviour authentically his own".

The third position that should be mentioned is uncompromisingly Aristotelian in nature. This theory is usefully discussed by Bernadette Tobin (1989b) who has consistently argued for an approach to moral development that takes proper account of the role of the virtues.

Tobin outlines an 'ideal outcome' in which the person of practical wisdom (the phronimos) develops towards:

... the ideal outcome of moral development in the Aristotelian scheme, a way of life in which one acts virtuously not just because one happens to have been brought up that way, but because one has reflected on one's upbringing and consciously acknowledged and endorsed the values one has acquired.

(Tobin, 1989b, p. 195)

Aristotle gives a complete account of the affective and conative dimension in moral development. He sees people passing through three stages of development, with the two most important being the second and third where people learn the 'that' and the 'why' of virtuous behaviour.

The 'that' tells a person what it is right or appropriate to do in particular circumstances. As such the 'that' can be imparted through training. The 'why' is produced by reflection and produces the independent justification for what is seen to be right or appropriate.

A man of practical wisdom has also been encouraged to reflect, carefully and sensitively, on what he has been taught, test it against his own experience in the circumstances of his life and, in freely making its own, to express his own dignity and integrity.

(Tobin, 1989 b, p. 197)

The Aristotelian position is intrinsically attractive for three reasons in particular. Firstly, Aristotle provides a properly integrated account of how the cognitive, affective and conative dimensions relate to the development of practical wisdom. Secondly, Aristotle's notion of human flourishing tends to defy dogmatic attempts to limit the conception of the good. His conception of 'human beings' is realistic, as it is based on an acceptance of their vital essence as sensual creatures of flesh and blood. Finally, Aristotle establishes an impeccable foundation for practical reasoning. Reflection on general principles is perfectly acceptable. However, Aristotle requires that each situation be properly assessed in its particularity. This encourages a high degree of engagement with events of the world.

Kohlberg, Peters and Tobin provide arguments in support of the proposition, advanced in this chapter, that autonomy ought to be an aim of ethics education. Yet the Aristotelian scheme also provides an indication of the role of ethics training. The link established by Aristotle flows from his observation that in the second stage of development it will be necessary for a person to be provided with guidance as to what is right or appropriate in particular circumstances.

In many cases this sort of guidance will be provided by persons in the wider community - family members, influential peers and role models and so on. However, within the context of the workplace, this task will fall to those charged with the responsibility of providing training in ethics. As noted above, the purpose of this training will be to reinforce values and dispositions that support or maintain the organisation's ethos.

One hopes that this ethos will be one in support of ethical behaviour. That is, one hopes that the ethos of the organisation will function in a way that is conducive to human flourishing (amongst its various stakeholder groups). In such an organisation, training in ethics will ensure that each person has the opportunity, knowledge and skills to engage in 'virtuous' behaviour. Under the Aristotelian theory this will lead to a situation in which such behaviour will become habitual.

Some see the encouragement of sound beliefs about how to act as being nothing more than a thinly disguised form of indoctrination. If this was all there was to the theory and attendant process, then this might be fair comment. However, it must always be remembered that the programme is only justified, according to this argument, if it forms part of a larger project which includes an ethics education of a kind that promotes an authentic and autonomous allegiance to ethical principles. As noted above, the reasons for taking this extra step derive from the recognition of fundamental ethical principles and the consideration of matters of prudence and effectiveness.

Having sketched the bare outlines of a theoretical underpinning for the distinction between ethics education and training, and having given some indication of the reasons why both approaches ought to be adopted, what can be said about the content of such a programme?

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The content of a program

It will be recalled that a point of earlier discussion focused on four factors thought to affect the current concern about ethics. These were:

1. Public cynicism about the institutions of society
2. A reaction of the 'guilt' reflex
3. The need for certainty
4. The perceived link between ethics and 'best practice'

It was also suggested, in passing, that these factors need to be borne in mind when developing a programme of ethics education/training. This is because the same factors operating on a broad social front can be found at work within the structures of organisations.

Cynicism about the institutions of the organisation

Members of an organisation are frequently cynical about the 'true' level of commitment by senior mangers to publicly professed ethical principles. Whether it be in the public sector or the private sector, many people feel that there is a ‘values gap’. This gap represents the breach between what is claimed to be the organisation's values and what, in fact, it stands for in its relationships.

One example may suffice to make the point. There is a public utility in New South Wales that professes a commitment to the principle of honesty. Yet counter staff operate under a riding instruction that they are not to volunteer information to pensioners that they are entitled to rebates. In order to protect revenue, rebates will only be paid to those who request them. While it might be argued by some that the failure to volunteer information is not dishonest, people working in the utility feel that there are two agendas at work. Management may say one thing but all their actions suggest that they mean another.

Similar circumstances arise in the private sector. Remuneration policies often send signals that contradict an organisation's professed ethical stance. For example, a company may stress that it will not engage in 'sharp practices'. Yet, promotions and remuneration will be paid to the person who delivers the goods (even if they achieve this result by cutting a few corners).

Such circumstances give rise to an understandable degree of cynicism in the work-force. The existence of a 'values-gap' of some sort is almost inevitable. However, it should be recognised that such a gap is extremely corrosive of trust.

A programme of ethics education/training will need to be developed on a firm base of values that are the true expression of what an organisation holds to be important.

A reaction of the 'guilt' reflex

While the claim that the general public may have been broadly affected by a sense of its tacit participation in the 'excesses of the '80s' may be open to question, there can be little doubt that the members of organisations more directly linked to the events feel guilt by association. In some cases, the feeling of shame is so powerful that people will try to hide the fact that they are employed by a particular company or authority. Evasive action has been known to range from refusing to wear company 'livery' in public to lying to neighbours about the individual's place of work.

This is not to suggest that feelings of guilt or shame are either appropriate or helpful. However, one needs to recognise that many people identify quite closely with their employers. It is therefore important that a programme of ethics education/training be capable of addressing issues of concern.

The need for certainty

While it is essential that people be prepared to take responsibility for their own actions and that there be a corresponding sense of accountability which applies across an organisation, it is also necessary to ensure that individuals know and understand what is expected of them. As noted above, people hanker after certainty - especially during periods of rapid change. While the rate of change is seldom subject to control, it is possible to communicate a reasonably settled framework of values.

A programme of ethics education/training will need to communicate the range of rules, duties and obligations that will help to define an acceptable basis for relationships and behaviour within the organisation.

The perceived link between ethics and 'best practice'

Most of the comments under this heading have been made at an earlier point. All that needs to be said is that a serious commitment to developing 'best practice' will involve an equal commitment to establishing an organisational ethos that is supportive of that goal. This, in turn, suggests that it will be necessary to move away from deep hierarchical structures that depend on 'external' measures to regulate the ethos of an organisation towards one in which the ethos is maintained because people have, to a certain extent, 'internalised' the values of the organisation.

A programme of ethics education/training will need to foster dispositions and values that are consistent with achieving best practice.

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The ethics training component

Following the arguments that have been outlined above, ethics training will need to encompass the following features:

1. The induction of individuals into the culture / ethos of an organisation
2. The introduction and exploration of the organisation's formalised codes of ethics and conduct
3. The development of dispositions appropriate to the organisation's ethos
4. The development of a critical capacity to identify (and where possible correct) practices and procedures that are inimical to the task of maintaining and developing the organisation's ethos
5. The development of a critical capacity to reflect on the organisation's founding principles

Consistent with earlier argument, the training programme should seek to foster development of the cognitive, affective and conative domains of each person. It should also have a fundamental aim of raising awareness of the ethical dimension that envelopes all people as they make choices about what to do in various circumstances. Bearing in mind the Aristotelian 'flavour' of the developing argument, it should be noted that the training component (in particular) will need to concentrate on practical issues of concern and relevance.

1. The induction of individuals into the culture/ethos of an organisation

Each organisation will (or should) have its own individual character which is likely to vary according to the particular ends which it seeks to serve, or according to the general context in which it is set. This character will be formed from an amalgam of the personalities of individuals who participate in the life of the organisation. This interplay of personalities is a matter of complex transactions that can, over time, help to create an atmosphere that is recognisably the institution's own.

Although 'ethical organisations' will share much that is common in terms of their fundamental commitments, this is not to suggest that there needs to be a convergence on some single 'model' of the ethical organisation. A commitment to ethics does not imply a commitment to homogeneity.

The individual differences in the ethos of organisations is, to a significant degree, a reflection of their different histories. It is therefore important that a process of induction draw on the history of an organisation as a way of helping to explain how it is that the ethos has developed into its current form.

The use of history might involve:

• explaining the origin of the organisation,
• examining the reasons for its creation and how these reasons might have changed over time,
• drawing on the organisation's store of folk tales, and so on.

2. The introduction and exploration of the organisation's formalised codes of ethics and conduct

Many organisations are in the process of developing Codes of Ethics and Codes of Conduct. Ideally, the development of codes should be seen as just one stage in an integrated process by which ethical concerns are built into the fabric of an organisation.

Where already developed, the codes should form the basis for part of the programme of ethics training. All persons to whom the codes apply should be introduced to them. This introduction should include:

• an explanation of the reasons for their introduction
• the process by which they were developed
• identification of underlying principles
• substantive issues of content
• implied behavioural expectations
• the interpretative framework that is being applied to the codes
• the processes that will apply in the case of a breach being discovered
• the nature of sanctions that might be applied in case of a breach
• the scope for review

There should also be an opportunity for people to 'interrogate' the codes in order to see if they make sense when applied under the conditions where they work. Problems should be few and far between if the codes have been properly developed in the first place.

3. The development of dispositions appropriate to the organisation's ethos

Ethics training should be part of a process that reinforces dispositions that are consistent with the organisation's ethos. For example, the organisation might value the dispositions to be courteous, candid, honest and so on. Should this be so then training can augment other positive reinforcement such as praise and reward.

Ethics training should include opportunities to explore what it means to be, say, courteous, candid and honest in a variety of conditions and circumstances. Most importantly, the training should explore issues where there is a conflict of values or ethical dilemma. One extremely effective means for effecting this process is to use role-play exercises. They are especially good as a means of reinforcing certain positive dispositions as they can allow a person to experience what it feels like to be treated, say, without courtesy, candour or honesty.

4. The development of a critical capacity to identify (and where possible correct) practices and procedures that are inimical to the task of maintaining and developing the organisation's ethos.

As noted above, there is little point in developing a formalised framework of ethical principles if the informal world of custom and practice disavows all that is professed. Ethics training should assist people in the task of identifying practices that are inconsistent with the values of the organisation.

That is, ethics training should aim to raise awareness of the ethical dimension that surrounds all that we do. One positive side-effect of this is that there will be a sense in which people (other than managers) feel that they have a 'stake' in the process of regulating the ethos of the organisation. There is a further practical benefit that flows from such training. This is that people will become far more self-aware in the performance of their duties. Such self-awareness is essential to the success of programmes such as Total Quality Management.

Ethics training to achieve this aim should concentrate on the examination of hypothetical and real-life case studies drawn from the experience of those undertaking the training. The examination of such issues ought to be complemented by the development of general skills of analysis.

Some managers resist this element of training as it may be perceived as an opportunity to reflect adversely on their performance. Such misgivings are understandable and should be addressed as part of a wider programme to foster the conditions of open communication and constructive criticism by and from all people in the organisation (whatever their 'level').

5. The development of a critical capacity to reflect on the organisation's founding principles

It was noted above that by themselves the aims of ethics training allow for the possibility of an element of indoctrination. The risk of indoctrination can be managed by building into the training programme a component that is specifically designed to develop a critical capacity not only to reflect on the organisation's underlying principles but also the process of training itself.

Appropriate training at this point will involve the development of skills of critical thinking including:

• the ability to analyse an argument
• the ability to recognise cases of inconsistency and contradiction
• the ability to uncover underlying values, assumptions
• the ability to argue a case (or 'unpack' a case study), and so on

In short, each person should be assisted in the development of the skills of ethical reflection.

It will have been observed that the distinction between training and education has, at this point, begun to blur.

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The education component

It has been argued that an Aristotelian conception of moral development recognises that the ideal end of moral development is the person of practical wisdom. It has also been argued that the process towards this end depends on there being an appropriate framework of training which will impart principles that a person can then make his or her own.

This suggests an answer to questions raised by Noel Preston (1992, p.12) when responding to the address by Sir Max Bingham that was referred to above:

A fundamental question is whether the pedagogical aim of ethics education is merely to explain a code and alert public officials to the implied behavioural expectations, or whether it is to engage in a more comprehensive exploration of ethics in the professional life of public officials examining fundamental notions of 'public service', or even to explore meta-ethical questions such as, "why be moral at all?'

Without being disdainful of political and administrative realities, I believe some attempt should be made to widen the educative processes beyond a narrow consideration of technicalities and trivialities to fundamental philosophical questions.

This does not mean that one needs to fill the world with quasi-professional philosophers. But if one goes back to the original definition of the word philosophy (to seek wisdom) it may be no bad thing for people to be educated in ways that help them achieve this goal. Having said this, it should be noted that Preston wants people to consider fundamental philosophical questions. One presumes that this is because he shares the assumption of this chapter that the development of practical wisdom is intrinsically good for individuals and society at large.

It has also been argued that persons with practical wisdom bring benefit to any organisation in which they are based. This applies even in such strictly hierarchical structures as the armed forces. Although discipline and obedience can be achieved by all manner of external means (such as conditioning or fear of punishment), real effectiveness under modern conditions comes about when people understand and support the basis for operations.

An ethics education will crucially depend on the individual's capacity and willingness to take those extra steps necessary for autonomy. It is probably fair to say that not every person will want to take these steps. Some prefer the relative convenience of relying on the judgement of others. In many cases the convenience that flows from this is both a certain 'release' from responsibility combined with an ease of conscience (as there is no need for the individual to think through issues for him or her self). While it can be argued that to live such a life is to lack autonomy or live inauthentically, one must be realistic in accepting that some people choose to be this way.

However, although one might recognise this fact, it does not mean that an organisation can be absolved of its responsibility to offer and encourage an ethics education. This the organisation must do as part of its response to the danger of slipping into a process of indoctrination.

While it is far less easy to specify the exact content of an ethics education, the general features might be as follows:

• An examination of the broader context in which the individual is situated (including: his or her relationship to the organisation, society, and so on),
• An examination of general concepts that might help to define the relationship between the individual and the organisation (for example, what is meant by the idea of public service, what is the foundation for banking in society, what does it mean to be a professional?),
• An examination and assessment of the individual's own values,
• An examination of and assessment of the characteristic ways in which the person 'goes about his or her business',
• An examination of ethical theories (different moralities) to see what light they might throw on the individual's circumstances, values and so on,
• The further development of skills of critical reflection (including the ability to assess the relevance, appropriateness and value of certain dispositions).

While the content of an ethics education will be broader, the techniques to be employed will be similar. Thus, one will use case studies, role play, the use of texts drawn from the canon of classical literature and so on. The chief difference in approach is that in ethics education there is no substantive content to be taught. Rather, one is seeking to assist each person in the exploration of a personal (but not private) field of meaning.

As has been argued above, the aim of this education should be to allow the person to claim ownership of his or her ethical principles and dispositions. This does not mean that they will be different to those at work within the organisation. Indeed, if the ethos of the organisation is supportive of human flourishing, then it is probable that the autonomous moral agent will confirm the earlier position.

Some of the reasons for encouraging organisations to take this extra step have already been explored. There is, however, one other reason that ought to be borne in mind. Alasdair MacIntyre (1987) makes the following comment:

To be enlightened is to be able to think for oneself; but it is a familiar truth that one can only think for oneself if one does not think by oneself.

Organisations that fail to provide the opportunity for ethics education are likely to run the risk that the foundation of training is undermined when individuals seek to develop autonomy either in isolation or in dialogue with others who have no appreciation of the setting in which the person has to operate. This is not to suggest that organisations ought to seek to control the process of ethics education. Enough has been said to suggest that this strategy would be counter-productive and likely to fail.

From the point of view of the organisation, an ethics education will clearly provide opportunities that go far beyond what is of functional necessity. However, organisations that are truly serious in their endeavours to foster sound ethical behaviour will take the extra step.

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Can ethics be taught?

A tentative but affirmative answer to this question was provided at an earlier point in this paper. It should be evident that there is a certain amount of substantive content that can be conveyed to individuals as part of a programme in ethics education/training. There are also generic skills to do with reasoning about ethical issues that can be conveyed.

Some people claim that a person's ethics are formed at an early point in their life (almost at the mother's knee). There is an attendant feeling that the effects of society (and the broader environment) are so powerful that there is little point in proceeding beyond the most basic point in training. Conventional wisdom along these lines is increasingly open to challenge. As Parks (1993) has written:

Empirical evidence demonstrating the importance of moral education in the young adult years has been charted across the past decade and a half by researchers such as Conry and Nelson, Gandz and Hayes, Bebeau and Rest. This work, together with insights gained from constructive-developmental learning theory and our own study at Harvard Business School, strongly suggests that moral development can continue into adulthood, and that particularly dramatic changes can occur in young adulthood in the context of professional school education. Surely adult moral and ethical development occurs in a variety of settings, both formal and informal, but there is now ample evidence that ethical consciousness and commitment can continue to undergo transformation at least throughout formal education. These findings fly in the face of a good deal of conventional conviction.

Naturally enough, such education does not have to take place within the setting of formal education. But having said this, there is probably something to be said in favour of organisations making arrangements for a proportion of its programme of ethics education to be contracted out. A number of universities are now in the position where they can offer many of the components of an ethics education that were listed above.

This is not to suggest that the whole process of ethics education should be extra-mural. As argued above, it is important that the organisation maintain an involvement in the process - at least to the extent that it continues to provide a setting for development in the affective and conative domains.

Finally, it should be reiterated that only part of the programme of ethics education/training can be taught. The rest can only be offered to individuals on the basis that they will then need to make of the opportunities what they will.

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Conclusion

It has been argued that ethics education and training are related but different in their aims and processes. It has been further argued that a broadly Aristotelian approach suggests the need for both components. Part of the justification for this approach lies in its focus on the practical setting for decision-making. Another part of the justification is based on a belief that moral development is best fostered by offering a combination of 'training' and 'education' which provides a foundation from which a person moves to autonomy.

This chapter began with a brief survey of some of the factors that would seem to have made the topic of ethics an important matter of public concern. Some people point to the most recent failure of ethical standards as an inevitable feature of recurring cycles that seem to influence economic and social behaviour. Others claim that issues in ethics and morals are the private concerns of individuals. Still others see standards as being set by society at large. These people tend to throw up their hands in despair and ask, "But surely you don't expect all of society to change?".

But is that such an unrealistic expectation? One can immediately point to the change in general awareness of and sensitivity to the environment as one example of the way in which broad social attitudes can be altered. And there is something to be said for the environmentalists' credo "Think globally, act locally".

A broad concern about ethical issues could be translated into specific reforms affecting the ethos of individual organisations. Indeed, in the absence of other mediating structures (or in a period when the alternatives are under stress) it could be that the workplace will take on an added responsibility for fostering the disposition to be ethical.

Should this happen, then it will be consistent with what is now argued to be best practice. However, it should be borne in mind that this same theoretical framework calls for the genuine involvement and participation of those who make up the organisation. It is therefore going to be important that part of the process of ethics education/training involve a critical overview of the extent to which the programmes make actual allowance for the needs and interests of the individuals who participate.

Finally, something might be said about the starkest alternative to the approach outlined above. This would be to do nothing, to sit back and hope that the problem will go away. Such an approach is likely to be fraught with danger, for those who prescribe it as well as for the wider community. It is extremely unlikely that the active consideration of ethical concerns is going to disappear from the public horizon.

The cost of surrendering ethics is too well known to the community. As a result of this, the failure to initiate an appropriate response to the challenge of developing a programme of ethics education/training is likely to be an increase in calls for detailed regulation and surveillance.

Such an approach is a matter for two types of concern. Firstly, a process of strict regulation and surveillance nearly always fails to achieve its objective. People just find ways to get around the rules that they find to be a nuisance. Secondly, one of the costs of an over-reliance on regulation and surveillance is that a climate is created in which people find it convenient to surrender any sense of personal responsibility.

When people surrender a sense of personal responsibility then the conditions for trust are further eroded. These are the conditions in which concerned individuals begin to call for effective measures to protect society from itself. It is then but a short step to the circumstances, promoted by the likes of Hobbes and Rousseau and criticised by Mill, where we are forced to be free. Only this time, those who govern will want to attempt the folly of forcing us to be good.

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