Responsibility and accountability
by Simon Longstaff
What should we make of a 'loyalty' scheme which, amongst other things, generates receipts for an amount that exceeds the real cost to members when dining at selected restaurants? One correspondent is concerned that such arrangements have been contrived in a way that provides an opportunity for participants to 'rort' their expense accounts. His contention is that this is deliberate.
Promoters might respond by arguing that there is nothing, in such a scheme, that actually requires (or specifically encourages) a participant to act dishonestly. True, they might argue, some unscrupulous individual could cheat on their expense account or tax return. However, that would be a matter for the individual. How can the promoters be held accountable for what others do?
Such a response raises fundamental questions about the way in which responsibility should be allocated. Many would agree with the proposition that mature citizens should be recognised as responsible and accountable for what they do. Yet, what are the boundaries within which such an argument makes sense?
Should smokers be able to sue tobacco companies? Successful actions have been brought in a number of jurisdictions. Should a victim of shooting be able to sue the manufacturer of the weapon? Such a case was successfully prosecuted in the United States of America. Should the manufacturers of powerful motor vehicles share responsibility for the speeding offences of errant drivers? I know of no litigation in this area, yet!
In the case of tobacco products, there is an argument that the qualities that make them highly addictive for some people, lead smokers to start out in a voluntary capacity - only to become hooked at a later date. In these cases, subsequent addiction nullifies (or seriously limits) the smoker's responsibility for maintaining what is known to be a life-diminishing habit.
Suppose we conclude that addiction diminishes personal responsibility and hence, accountability. Does it necessarily follow that the purveyors of addictive substances are culpable in relation to their deleterious effects? This column is not the place to offer a comprehensive analysis of the arguments. However, it could be argued that knowingly engaging in the sale or promotion of addictive substances is to invite censure because to do so is to profit from another's weakness - a weakness over which the individual may have little or no control.
The principle is this; one profits by holding out the promise of a benefit which the buyer is entitled to assume will be enjoyed through the consumption of the product or service as a whole. In some cases 'hazardous elements' cannot be removed. Those who have profited in these circumstances, may then be required to make restitution for ill effects that could reasonably have been foreseen at the time of the sale.
What of the manufacturer of guns and fast cars? Can these cases be distinguished? One might take into account the underlying purpose(s) for which such things are made. Except in the limited case of target pistols, guns are designed and manufactured for only one purpose; namely, to maim and kill. In some cases, the purpose is even more refined; namely, to maim and kill people. On the other hand, automobiles are designed as a form of transport, or to race - but not to kill.
Thus, it is possible to see the bones of an argument for distinguishing between these two cases. Guns fall into a general class of things that are designed to cause specific harm to individuals (even if the overall intention is to do good). Cars do not.
Following this, it could be argued that a special responsibility and accountability should attach to those who design and build hand-guns, land mines, nuclear bombs and so on. The existence of such things might be open to justification. For example, they may be the only way in which to meet a particularly dire threat. However, this would not negate the possibility of a kind of prima facie accountability.
At the same time, an armed killer could still be held responsible and accountable for his or her actions. We might conceive of a kind of 'joint responsibility' in circumstances where lethal goods are used for anti-social purposes (even though these purposes were unintended by the manufacturers). For example, a manufacturer might be required to account for a lethal weapon's lack of safety features, or justify why the level of damage done is so disproportionate when compared to the type and level of threat normally encountered.
Interestingly, this argument would protect the manufacturer of implements regularly misused for violent ends - for example, the makers of kitchen knives, machetes and so on. In a similar way, we can see why car manufacturers are in the clear.
Even a cursory consideration of these cases suggests a need to take into account the intentions and knowledge of those who make and sell potentially harmful products and services. Is harm intended? If not, could the unintended ill effects have reasonably been foreseen?
What then of the scheme briefly described at the beginning of this article? Perhaps my correspondent's concern lies in a perception that the scheme seeks to tap into the human vice of greed - a vice that is as addictive and dangerous as any.
On the other hand, why presume that the worst in human nature will prevail? Are we beyond being able to trust people to act with honesty? Even if it was possible, would it be desirable to shape a world in which the free exercise of virtue has no place because there is no opportunity to resist vice? Or, are such questions evidence of naivety triumphing over prudence?
discuss this articleDr Simon Longstaff is Executive Director of St James Ethics Centre.
A version of this article was first published in 1995.
© St James Ethics Centre