One of the issues that has unsettled thinkers since the dawn of recorded time and up until the present is the problem of how, and about what, a person can be certain. This flows, in part, from the common observation that everything seems to be in a state of flux.

On the one hand, one need only look at the seasons, or the passage of a human life or the turning of the heavens to see that very few things which can be observed directly (if any), remain the same indefinitely.

Yet, if this is so, then how are we to claim knowledge of the world? At best, everything must be considered to be provisional. On the other hand, there is something of a conundrum in that whilst observations suggest that everything is subject to change there is also an intuitive feeling (again based on observation) that the patterns of a changing world are reasonably predictable.

Heraclitus, and his follower Cratylus, might have been correct to say that we can never step into the same river twice. However, even an acknowledgment of this point does not prevent people from being confident that when the Spring comes and the snows thaw then the river will rise. And at an even more basic level each of us goes to bed with the fairly uncontroversial belief that the sun will rise in the morning.

Thinking about such matters opens a 'Pandora's Box' of questions touching on the nature of the reality that we encounter. Just what is the world made out of? Why is there something rather than nothing? What is the foundation for reality? And so on! These are some of the enduring questions of metaphysics.

Before proceeding, a word of reassurance. This paper does not set out to be a 'potted history' of metaphysics. The strategy employed to avoid this outcome has been to exercise a degree of licence by focusing on a selection of key events - of which the most important was a 'watershed' in the way in which Western or, more properly, Modern society characteristically thinks about the world.

Whilst admitting that the following rendition of events is simplistic (almost to the extent of being a caricature), it nonetheless captures an essential point. This is that the 'watershed' involved a clash of two major 'world views' - one essentially medieval in outlook (but incorporating many features of thought developed in the classical age) and the other belonging to the period which would come to be called the Enlightenment, the precursor to our own Modern era. It will be argued that this 'watershed' marked a distinction in the way Western society chose to answer questions about the ultimate guarantee of certainty for what people claimed to know and understand.

In the medieval scheme of understanding, revelation and reason both placed God at the heart of all things, as the literal guarantee for their existence. Reference to and wide-spread belief in an omnipotent, omniscient, omnipresent being, existing outside of time and space, suggested that there was indeed a sure foundation for existence and hence some hope of true knowledge. Yet, despite drawing on the best of available evidence (including a selection from the arguments of the ancient Greeks), medieval philosophy was still regarded, by a growing number of critics, as being essentially speculative and hence unsatisfactory when measured against emerging standards for ensuring certainty.

It is against this background that the meditations of the great French philosopher and mathematician, Renee Descartes, should be assessed. While Galileo was wrestling with the problem of developing a scientific method which inevitably challenged some of the dogmas of the Church, Descartes was blazing a philosophical trail that would eventually find Man being hailed as the foundation for all meaning and reality.

Without meaning to do so, Descartes opened a door through which others marched in time, ready to declare that Man was not just at the centre of the Universe but its very heart. How did he do this and what was the impact of his solution? Above all, Descartes was the enemy of uncertainty and error. Building on the mathematical principles of his analytical geometry, Descartes sought to explain the world in all its variations as a place of certain mechanical principles that were clearly and distinctly amenable to scrutiny by Man's defining faculty; namely, his reason.

In search of certainty, Descartes devised and applied a method by which his reasoning was subjected to the most severe of tests. Nothing that could be the subject of error or doubt would be allowed to remain unchallenged; nor would it be allowed to figure in his determinations. Allowing that his senses might be deceived, Descartes proceeded to discount as reliable even the most obvious evidence of his senses. Thus, the process of reflection whittled away all doubtful (and therefore extraneous) propositions. Finally, Descartes found himself to be left with one famous and apparently incontrovertible proposition: Cogito ergo sum (I think therefore I am).

Here, at last, was the emergence of the self-certain subject who, being absolutely sure of his own existence (but not necessarily sure of any others'), was now competent to work outwards in order to conceptualise and articulate the mechanical principles at work throughout the Universe. But above all, with mathematics as the 'Queen of the Sciences', human beings were now entitled to feel confident in their ability to calculate.

It is important to understand the significance of Descartes' work in influencing the way in which the world has developed since his time. On the one hand there have been great intellectual labours as people have sought to uncover and, where possible, correct his errors. On the other hand, Descartes gave added impetus to scientific endeavour and in doing so helped to reinforce the foundation for a belief that the application of 'scientific method' would ultimately make the secrets of the Universe, and its workings, entirely penetrable to the mind of Man; a belief burning bright in the hearts of men like Francis Bacon whose life's work was to have culminated in the (unfinished) work entitled, The Great Instauration of the Power of Man over the Universe.

Thinking in and about ethics does not occur in a vacuum. Consequently, the processes of thought are not immune to the same intellectual influences at work in the rest of the community. However, it will be argued that, despite this, the area of ethics has proved to be infertile ground for the successful application of ‘calculative rationality’. The difficulty of achieving certainty in the field of ethics is something that many people find difficult to accommodate. In turn, this leads to a situation in which thinking about ethics can be devalued as imprecise and therefore as failing to meet the more 'acceptable' standards that are associated with the application of ‘calculative rationality’.

All of this obviously requires further explanation and perhaps the best place to begin is with a discussion of the nature of ethics itself. Many people recoil from such a discussion believing the topic to be inherently laden with inaccessible theory. Whilst much philosophical discourse is necessarily complex, there is an equal amount of debate that is perversely obscure. Like any group of specialists, philosophers tend to cling to an arcane vocabulary that may be precise for a few while being impenetrable to the many. All of this is especially vexing when it comes to ethics because the impression can be given that the discussion of ethical theory is remote from the experiences of daily life.

Nothing could be further from the truth. Ethics (as opposed to meta-ethics) is and always has been a practical study to do with the actions of people both individually, and more particularly, within society. Although there will be debate about the founding question in ethics, many would express it in the same form as allegedly used by Socrates; namely, "What ought one to do?".

As will be seen such a question is immensely practical in its import - giving rise to a whole host of other questions ranging from: the nature of 'goodness' itself, through to the more precise issues to do with one's respective duties and obligations.

Ethics is not the same as morality. While sometimes conflated, one way of understanding the difference is to think of various systems of morality as being distinct voices in a conversation which aims to answer the founding question, "What ought one to do?". These voices include those arising from various religious traditions as well as those which have been enunciated by philosophers and other theorists. On this model there is a Jewish voice providing answers to the fundamental question, just as there is a Christian voice, a Muslim voice, a Hindu voice, a Buddhist voice and so on. Very few voices remain univocal as each has its own subset of competing themes. Nor is each voice necessarily exclusive of all cadences in the others. Indeed, many of the traditional moralities share much in common, including reference to an ultimate source of verification in the form of a revealed God.

The developing train of thought in ethics is marked by the same 'watershed' that was described when discussing some of the early phases in Enlightenment thinking. Prior to the change in focus occasioned by the thinking of people like Descartes, it would have been tantamount to heresy to suggest that ethical questions could be answered without any reference to God. As will be recalled, it was generally believed that all things (including values) depended on God as the ultimate foundation for their very existence.

The certainty of this view had been reinforced as a result of the extraordinary achievements of men like St Thomas Aquinas who in a brilliant feat of intellectual endeavour managed to meld the apparently irreconcilable Aristotelian and Augustinian systems of thought. Surely, it was thought, if such a synthesis was possible then there was justification for belief in the truth of principles sanctioned by both divine revelation and the reason of Man. And on this foundation stood the Natural Law.

The challenge of Enlightenment thinking saw the maintenance of emphasis on what humankind could know and verify independently. However, the significance of a founding God was diminished. This is not to suggest that the relevance of God's role in establishing the norms for human life was discounted, as if overnight. Just as in other walks of life, the common stock of conceptions maintained a place for the sacred, and this holds (perhaps in smaller measure) even unto the present day. However, the absolute sovereignty of God's will was placed under threat as a curious amalgam of scepticism and a desire for certainty progressively led thinkers towards Nietzsche's ultimate position that Man was the source of all values and that God was dead.

Although open to the accusation of picking obvious targets, it may be useful to demonstrate the way in which 'calculative rationality' can be seen to have exercised its influence on two apparently different post-Enlightenment voices in the conversation about ethics. The effect is probably most obvious in the case of the development of Utilitarianism.

Utilitarianism has an ancient pedigree drawing on notions first articulated by the Epicureans. At its heart is a concern to choose to do those actions or apply those rules that maximise pleasure and/or minimise pain. The influence of 'calculative rationality' can be seen most clearly when one considers the means by which Utilitarians seek to determine a course of action based on a proper appreciation of the overall balance of pleasure and pain.

To do this they quite literally employ a 'Utilitarian Calculus' which factors in the respective elements of pleasure or pain (or in some variations, interests, needs etc) for particular individuals and groups and is then used to determine a result for the proposal under consideration. In its crudest form, those action or rules that the calculations show to provide a net balance of pleasure are agreed to be morally commendable and therefore to be allowed or required.

Having recognised the possibilities inherent in this theory its progenitors did not lie idle. Certain of the validity of their reasoning, adherents sought to apply the principles. This was attempted on a spectacular scale when Bentham's successors, people like James Mill, Trevelyan and Macaulay, participated in the government of nineteenth century British India.

One of the most serious criticisms of Utilitarianism is based on the observation that some of its apparent consequences appear to be intuitively unjust. For example, a raw Utilitarian Calculus may lead to an outcome in which one innocent person is sacrificed to protect a number of others - the reasoning being that the individual's sacrifice involves less pain in total than that of the combined wellbeing of the others.

Some Utilitarians believe that such difficulties can be overcome by looking at rules rather than specific acts and by considering preferences rather than units of pleasure and pain. Whatever the case, for the purpose of this paper the significant point relates to the use of a calculus supposedly designed to provide a technique for achieving certainty when considering issues in ethics.

One of the great 'secular' alternatives to Utilitarianism is represented by a tradition most closely associated with the name of Immanuel Kant. Kant's approach is in many respects closer to the tradition of rationalism that flows most directly from Descartes. As with the earlier Natural Law theorists, Kant argued that human beings can be distinguished from other creatures because of their capacity for rational reflection.

This capacity is allied to a potential to escape the bonds of physical necessity by virtue of our having a 'will' that is free. Kant argued that the only perfectly good thing is a perfectly good will. It is clearly not possible in a paper such as this to give a complete outline of Kant's theory. However, one of the salient features is that Kant proposes a series of steps which must be followed if any course of action is to confirm with what he calls the "categorical imperative". This imperative is one that ought to be obeyed for no reason other than that it is required by duty. One should not consider the consequences of an action, only the form of the reasoning that has (or has not) been satisfied.

Thus, Kant proposes (amongst other tests which will not be considered fully here) that we should act so that the principle of our action could be willed to be a universal law. In practical terms this leads; for example, to the application of a principle of non-contradiction which works as follows. Kant argues that it is always wrong to tell a lie. Part of his reasoning is based on the fact that if oneself to lie then it must be allowed for everybody. And if lying is allowed for everybody then there will be no foundation for truth or falsehood at all. If this occurs then the whole notion of 'a lie' will disappear and this, of course, will invalidate the original principle because it will have established the grounds for its own contradiction or inapplicability.

The first encounter with Kant can be a little confusing. Yet, it is quite obvious that some of the implications of Kant's position are as intuitively unsettling as those that flow from Utilitarianism. For example, if asked a direct question by a group of thugs bent on violence, then Kant's absolute prohibition against lying would have a person answer truthfully and reveal the whereabouts of a potential and innocent victim.

The other somewhat surprising similarity with Utilitarianism is that Kant's theory also seeks to provide a rational system that will provide the basis for a certain determination of what one ought to do. To be fair to Kant and the other moral philosophers, they are quite explicit that it is wrong to treat people as means to another person's end. Instead they argue that each person is an end in him or her self.

This is quite different to that element in 'calculative rationality' that tends to encourage a perspective in which all things other than the individual are considered as if to be an object or commodity. However, whilst the importance of this should be given full weight, it is maintained that the central features of 'calculative rationality' are still at work in ethics. It reveals its hand in every attempt to construct a system for the resolution of ethical issues and dilemmas. This would perhaps be of little import except for the fact that 'calculative rationality' has shown itself to be spectacularly unsuccessful in dealing with the most common denizen on the landscape of ethics; the ethical dilemma.

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The relevance for business and the professions

It has been argued that the conduct of business and the professions in Australia (or any country like it) is more than likely to be influenced by the fact that most thinking is of a form which reflects the structure of ‘calculative rationality’. It has also been argued that the subject of ethics abounds with dilemmas of a kind that are unable to be resolved by the application of techniques that are designed to ensure predictability and certainty through control.

Yet, much of the response to the problem of ethics (most particularly in the 1980s) has been to try to apply techniques that will 'rectify' the situation. These techniques are focused on the development of various sets of rules and regulations that are largely designed to provide increased certainty for those most directly concerned as well as security the community at large.

The use of codes of conduct (sometimes mistakenly labelled as codes of ethics) is increasing throughout industry sectors and the professions. Is there any significance in the observation that in the case of industry and commerce such codes are frequently 'designed' by individuals in the legal department or by someone delegated the task within the office of the Company Secretary? Or that at other times a consultant is asked to research and design the code which is then delivered to the company as a 'product'?

Having been approved by a management committee (and occasionally by a sub-committee of the board) the code is delivered to the personnel of the enterprise. In some cases, employees are required to sign the document in order to record the fact that the code has been received (and presumably understood). This process is sometimes augmented by training sessions designed to explain the code and its requirements. And in many cases this is where the process ends.

The enterprise is now deemed to be 'ethical' (or at least to have covered itself in case of enquiry). The evolution of the process along the lines just described is not all that unusual. Many people feel the process to be incidental to the real function of an enterprise. As a consequence, the cheapest and most immediate approach is that which will be adopted.

It is not intended to criticise those individuals who thinking that matters to do with ethics are susceptible to a quick fix. It is quite likely that the alternative point of view has really never occurred to them. There are, of course, exceptions where the process is far more considered and involves a thorough review of principles, systems, institutions, customs, practice and so on - a review which ideally involves those affected.

None of this is meant to denigrate the importance or usefulness of codes. However, questions must be asked about a process that is often performed as if just the latest in a series of management techniques. Codes have a place, but they are no substitute for a more complete reappraisal of the ethos of an organisation.

In the case of the professions there is a related but different issue to be considered. Many people consider that the ability to exercise self-regulation is one of the defining characteristics of a profession. There are a number of other defining characteristics, some of which it can be argued are of greater significance. A professional commitment to public service immediately comes to mind. Yet, there is a perception that many professionals equate the topic of professional ethics with an exclusive reference to the rules of the profession. The rules provide a relatively steady framework in that they are frequently expressed in a code of conduct, which may include rulings and the like.

It is, in fact, relatively unusual to find documents that are recognisable as codes of ethics. Perhaps the closest to be published so far is that issued recently by the AMA. It must be asked whether a 'rule based' system of ethics is really adequate by itself. Just as codes have a valuable role to play in industry and commerce, so rules and regulations have an important role to play in the life of the professions. There is, however, a problem when these rules become a substitute for personal judgement and responsibility. And this is a real risk.

Business and the professions are affected by decisions made at the 'macro' level where governments, their creatures and like institutions are able to operate. There is frequently an under-estimation of the power of such bodies to establish norms that trickle down to the most fundamental units in society. That is one reason why it is important that governments be especially sensitive about the kinds of signals that their actions generate.

Part of this awareness involves the government in having the means to correctly 'read' the constituency's 'de-coding' sequences. If politicians and other decision makers are allowed or forced to be too remote, then the de-coding process may be compromised with the result that another type of self-referential 'loop' will be created. Given that Machiavelli's principles are more or less in place (both in a domestic and international form of realpolitik) then it is again likely that the 'loop' will be fed by considerations of what works - and not necessarily by an appreciation based on other ways of looking at the issues. Thus, one encounters the response that regulation and surveillance ought to be increased in order to protect the common good.

Each level of response is designed to apply familiar techniques capable of achieving some sort of control over a troubling phenomenon. However, the troubling phenomenon may itself be a product of the very forces in thinking that are now applied in the form of a 'solution". Here again is the case in which a fateful circularity operates as technique is applied to the undesirable consequences of ... technique.

It follows from this argument that the well-known 'excesses of the 1980s' were not just an aberration in which the greedy and rapacious took control. An analysis of the power of greed to motivate people will be part of an explanation. However, why did greed manage to gain a foothold? Why were the moral sensibilities of so many people apparently silenced? Why did a number of professions stand back and allow a number of their members to become 'guns-for hire", ready to do almost anything to satisfy the wants of the highest bidder? In short, why did a few unscrupulous individuals receive the support of what Henry Bosch has aptly described as a "cast of thousands' ?

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The way ahead: are there any lessons for management?

One of the difficulties facing those who would traverse the ethical landscape with a sense of easy familiarity, is that has been a reduction in the number of institutions able to provide effective guidance and preparation for the journey. This reduction has been, in part, due to a loss of respect for the relevance of many of the institutions that have had a traditional role in the process of ethical formation. Casualties include: the churches, schools and even the earlier established range of family types.

This is not to say that the work of such institutions provided the total stock of values to be carried through life.

On the contrary, providing that there is some capacity for ethical reflection, and a desire and opportunity to do so, then values are always open to revision as a life proceeds. Where people are in employment, it is almost certain that the work environment will be one of the most powerful institutions affecting the individual's values. With this in mind, it is important to consider whether management has a proper appreciation of how important questions of corporate ethos may be in terms of their affect on society at large. When other traditional institutions are weak then those that are strong have a disproportionate influence.

It can be argued that great influence implies great responsibility. If this proposition is accepted then influence will be exercised with a conscious sense of the wider implications. Alternatively, the process of forming a corporate culture may be informed by nothing other than instrumental considerations. Another possibility is that an ethos will develop 'by accident'. Whatever the process, it is fairly clear that 'custom and practice' at work will have an impact beyond the factory or office door.

It is indeed a curious twist of fate that the reflections in this paper have been made especially relevant by developments in technology. Of particular relevance are those which threaten to limit our capacity to have 'private' values that are reserved for personal application, usually in a non-work environment. An increasing number of changes taking place in the way in which work is organised make value questions into matters of urgent practical importance. It is not just that old techniques are giving way to the new or that an increasing range of manual tasks are being automated. These changes are only to be expected and as such have received adequate analysis. But what has been the effect on ethics?

One part of the answer begins with the fact that management theory has come to recognise the importance of involving all employees in the decision-making processes of organisations. This is, in part, because it is now easier to keep people informed. But beyond this, new technologies require that all workers bring their intellects to bear in the performance of their duties. Flatter management structures, and a new range of opportunities for interaction within enterprises, now make it essential that personnel draw on a value base when considering options. It is increasingly the case that each person employed is now required to have a point of view and to be able to articulate a position that is in accord with it.

This being the situation, it is easy to see that there may be serious difficulties for those who feel uncomfortable with the dominant values of the workplace. Such people are now less able to shield themselves from involvement. That is why it has become so important for companies to involve all of their personnel in the formation of the corporate ethos (or character). This goes beyond being a matter of courtesy. Any manager concerned to develop a harmonious work environment cannot afford to ignore this issue. Understanding this particular effect of 'technological' change leads one to a realisation that the development of a corporate culture requires more than that there be a determination of this matter by a company's board and senior management.

As has been implied in earlier sections, there is no escaping the additional requirement that there be a commitment of resources (mainly in the form of time) so that the culture can evolve in a way that allows for all of those affected to be involved.

Such a commitment will be viewed by some as being frivolous expenditure - especially during a recession. However, it can be argued that this is exactly the time to expend resources on restructuring an enterprise so that it is ready to reap the benefits when the business cycle turns. None of this is meant to suggest that management should surrender its right to manage. Nor does it mean that corporations should be at the mercy of consensus politics. In fact, quite the opposite conclusion is suggested.

Those in management positions must come to understand that their role involves an indispensable requirement that they be able to lead. Leadership and management are not necessarily the same thing. Without wanting to outline a comprehensive list of qualities possessed by a leader, it may be suggested that such a list would include an ability and preparedness to persuade others to accept a shared perspective on what is desirable in terms of outcomes and behaviour.

This ability to draw people together in a common understanding and purpose may involve the application of skills and qualities that are different to those thought most desirable in earlier decades. Strangely enough, it may be that improved technology will make it less important that senior managers have special skills in areas of technical competence. 'People related' skills will become correspondingly more important and in line with Ferguson's approach, the days of the generalist or, even better, the Renaissance figure may be back.

The other approach that will need to be considered by managers is one which involves a much more profound change in approach. In particular, managers find themselves with no other alternative than to question and then abandon an instrumental rationale for addressing issues of corporate character. A failure to make this radical re-assessment may lead to a loss of the shared practices on which, for example, trust is based.

As noted before, 'trust' is a form of 'knowledge of the second kind' and can not be created or re-created by external forces or the deployment of technical expertise. It may seem to be a somewhat fanciful suggestion; however, it is argued that managers should be guided by the combination of reason and intuition when addressing the ethical dimension of their practice. That is, conscience should be allowed to have its say.

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