Land sites and rites
by Simon Longstaff
What might John Locke's ethical justification for the existence of money have to do with the fate of unused building sites? And how might this relate to one of the most important debates continuing to face Australians?
ABC Radio National's Earthbeat program recently reported the actions of an Oxford academic who has led attempts to establish a commune on 'vacant land' in London. The commune appears to be flourishing - at least for the time being. Needless to say, the squatters' action has generated considerable controversy. Some take the side of the irate speculator who charges that, apart from the issue of trespass, he is now prevented from realising the increased value of his investment. Others support the squatters - romantic underdogs who have taken on the establishment in order to return to a simpler form of community life.
At the centre of the controversy is the status of the land. Unoccupied, the issue might involve questions about the proper use of a fairly ordinary vacant plot. Occupied, there are different issues to do with the nature of 'stolen property' and the rights of owners.
There are some fairly obvious ways in which the rights of property owners are already limited. For example, some laws permit the wheel-clamping or removal of vehicles that have exceeded the time permitted for parking. Restrictions also apply in the case of real property - planning regulations, for example. It might be argued that limitations of this sort still leave the ownership of the property undisturbed. Although the car cannot be driven for the moment, it is, nonetheless, still the property of the owner. For another person to take it away for their own use would seem to be a reasonably uncontroversial case of stealing.
Yet, there are other cases where ownership is forfeited. In some of these, the system of justice will lead to the imposition of penalties (fines and so on). Beyond this, one might think of such instances as: the scheme under which illegal weapons must be surrendered and the compulsory acquisition of land for public purposes. Even the levying of certain taxes (death duties etc) may involve the enforced transfer of property.
The examples cited above usually involve the actions of government - notionally working for the good of the community as a whole. This is an important point as it helps to define a class of actions in which the chief reason for limiting the rights of personal ownership is an appeal to community interests or the greater good. How to balance the interests of the community against the rights of individuals may be crucial to resolving the types of issue outlined above. It should also be noted that many types of compulsory acquisition by government lead to the payment of compensation in cash or kind. Whether the level of compensation is usually fair or adequate is a further question.
How then should the case of the vacant plot in London be judged? In particular, is the Oxford Don a thief - who justly deserves our censure?
Part of the answer might be found in the thoughts of the seventeenth century British philosopher, John Locke. Despite his reputation as a defender of property rights (which he took to include Life Liberty and Possessions), Locke also argued that it was wrong to possess more than could be used. Imagine a person who owns an orchard that produces more apples than can be consumed in a season. In these circumstances, Locke argued, others may take the surplus apples and consume them even if the 'owner' refuses permission.
A moment's reflection will suggest that this is a fairly radical doctrine. On face value, it appears to countenance stealing. Locke's response is to say that the owner had no right to the surplus apples in the first place and that, for this reason, their use does not amount to theft. There is undeniable tension in this position, and this is where the invention of money comes in. Where apples might rot if not used, money (especially in the form of gold) can be held indefinitely. This is why taking another person's money is properly regarded as theft while 'scrumping' surplus apples is allowed.
What then of the suggestion that the vacant block has been 'stolen' by the squatter from Oxford? One argument is that the land is obviously surplus to the requirements of the speculator - otherwise it would be put to good use. At the same time, land is a scarce and vital commodity that others need. The link with Locke's argument should be obvious. From the squatters' point of view, land should be used for some proper purpose. The idea that it can be left vacant until prices rise or kept in that state so as to restrict supply and increase the value of other holdings is rejected by critics who say that this tactic is illegitimate when compared to that of other investors who accumulate wealth by putting their capital to work.
However, does vacant land 'spoil' in the sense that Locke's apples rot? It is true that our language speaks of the 'wasteland'. Various holes dotted around the cities of the world seem to fit that description fairly well. Even so, the land doesn't become unusable just because it is left idle for a period of time.
It is, of course, impossible to explore all of the relevant arguments in an article like this. However, debate about such matters should have a particular significance for Australians. One of the great unresolved questions for this nation is to do with how the land should be understood and 'held'.
When, if ever, is 'wilderness' a kind of 'waste'? Do the owners of 'undeveloped' land have an obligation to give way when the needy claim it? Do certain patterns of use confer a more secure form of title than others? Is there a need to distinguish between land held in the bush as opposed to the cities?
Debates about issues such as native title, sustainable development and so on provide an important local context. Having said this, it's important to remember that these are issues of global significance - raising waves that even lap at the banks of the Thames.
Dr Simon Longstaff is Executive Director of St James Ethics Centre.
A version of this article was published in The Australian Financial Review on 1 October 1996, page 17, and was entitled 'Balancing communal interests'.
© St James Ethics Centre
