Whistleblowing:
Some observations concerning the public and private sector experiences
by Simon Longstaff
Contents:
- Introduction
- A preliminary overview
- Establishing adequate reporting procedures
- Reducing the risk to whistleblowers
- Some general considerations
- Should there be a duty to report wrongdoing?
- The contradiction between expected loyalty and honesty & balancing obligations
- Reacting to reports of wrongdoing
- Conclusion
Introduction
Towards the end of 1991, Time magazine published an article about the experience of whistleblowers in Australia. As with any good headline the title of the cover story provided an eloquent and succinct summation of the issues. In this case the piece was entitled 'Integrity and Ruined Lives'.
Amongst other things, the article is testimony to the courage of those honest individuals who have put their convictions before a concern for their personal wellbeing. In many cases, the disclosures made by whistleblowers brought advantage to the community at large while at the same time resulting in loss to the individuals who saw fit to raise the alarm.
It is curious that we praise the deeds of citizens who engage in acts of physical heroism yet tend to damn the morally courageous. The person who foils a bank robbery is widely applauded. Why then do so many of us shrink from the company of those who reveal corruption and mismanagement? Any person familiar with the literature on whistleblowing will be aware of the Fitzgerald Report's comments on the matter. Fitzgerald's words bear repetition as they aptly describe the situation affecting those in both the private and public sectors. He said:
It is enormously frustrating and demoralising for conscientious and honest public servants to work in a department or instrumentality in which maladministration or misconduct is present or even tolerated or encouraged. It is extremely difficult for such officers to report their knowledge to those in authority.
Even if they do report their knowledge to a senior officer, that officer might be in a difficult position. There may be no-one that can be trusted with the information.
If either senior officers and/or politicians are involved in misconduct or corruption, the task of exposure becomes impossible for all but the exceptionally courageous or reckless, particularly after indications that such disclosures are not only unwelcome but attract retribution.
(Fitzgerald, 1989, p.134)
There is an important reason for beginning this paper with these observations. It is that, in discussing the issue of whistleblowing, there is a tendency to lose sight of the fact that our deliberations have a direct bearing on the welfare of individual human beings and, through them, on society at large. It is somewhat paradoxical that in developing systems and procedures that protect whistleblowers one can be seduced by the intellectual challenges of developing technique to such an extent that the human scale of the problem is lost from sight.
The significance of this goes beyond the expression of a concern to ensure that the discussion is properly focused. Concentrating on the issues as matters of human concern also helps to reinforce an understanding that there is no one 'knock down' solution that can be applied to the challenge of responding to the phenomenon called ‘whistleblowing’. This phenomenon arises in a context which is imbued with the type of complexity that is apparent in any social construct. In this case, the context is largely defined by debates about topics such as fraud, corruption and mismanagement. To enter these debates is to become entangled in arguments concerning the bounds of loyalty, the political dimensions of accountability and the role of custom and practice in the definition of acceptable behaviour.
It may be helpful to envisage the issue of whistleblowing as one strand in a web of concerns. As such, the response to its challenges should be part of an integrated approach. As McMillan (1988) has argued there is a need for multiple overlapping countermeasures in the control of fraud as well as other essentials including: a diverse media; freedom of information; and whistleblower protection.
One final comment by way of introduction. It is important to recognise that the response to whistleblowing presents challenges to both the private and public sectors. Whilst it is true that each sector has distinctive features which affect the definition of the problem, it may be that the differences are decreasing in both incidence and significance. This is especially so as the processes of corporatisation and privatisation of the public sector continue throughout Australia.
Developments over the last decade have seen convergence between the private and public sectors of a kind that has resulted in a subtle blurring of the lines of intersection. These developments include such innovations as; outsourcing of public sector service delivery and public financing of private sector development of infrastructure that would previously have been carried out by government. In this respect, it is important to note that thinking about the interface between the public and private sectors has continued to evolve, in quite significant ways, over the last year or so.
One important example of the way in which opinion is evolving can be seen in the Report of the Senate Select Committee on Public Interest Whistleblowing, In the Public Interest (1994). For example, the Committee recommended that:
... the Public Interest Disclosures Agency and the provisions of the supporting legislation be given the widest coverage constitutionally possible in both the private and public sector (para 8.69).
(my highlighting, 1994, p.xvi)
In passing, it should be noted that this report should be required reading for anyone interested in the topic of whistleblowing. Those familiar with reports previously issued by State government and Commonwealth enquiries will recognise the importance of this recommendation as it consolidates the ground broken in both South Australia and Queensland where the definition of whistleblower protection coverage has been extended in ways designed to include elements within the private sector. This process of extension has not been approved throughout all jurisdictions.
For example, the Senate Select Committee's recommendation goes much further than the position contemplated during a similar enquiry conducted by Members of the Parliament of New South Wales. The NSW enquiry took the view that protection should only be afforded to public servants who have justifiably blown the whistle under current or past terms of service.
In NSW, there were grave reservations about extending coverage to the private sector. Those who argue against the extension of protection to the private sector generally do so on the basis that whistleblower protection legislation would involve further government intrusion into the relationship between employers and employees in such a way as to cause a significant conflict of duties. One reply is that the community has a particular interest in ensuring that its laws are upheld and that no relationship of employer to employee is such that it should anticipate either party having to remain silent in the face of evidence of illegality.
As seen above, the Senate Select Committee has taken a broader view, recognising that there are many who have concerns about wrongdoing in or by the public sector, but who are not employed as public servants. Furthermore, the Senators have recognised that there is a public interest in ensuring that there be protection for people working in the private sector who have good reason to 'blow the whistle' to the appropriate Commonwealth regulatory authority. Hence the specific recommendation that the banking industry be subject to whistleblowers protection legislation and that the Reserve Bank of Australia be empowered to receive and investigate public interest disclosures relating to the banking industry.
It has been noted that recommendations such as this are far removed from the kind of thinking that has previously dominated debate about the extent to which whistleblowers protection ought to be afforded. At the very least, it may suggest that it is misleading to try and divide the topic artificially into matters affecting the private and public sectors respectively. Perhaps a more generic approach is required in which conduct meriting protection is defined - irrespective of its locus.
Having said this, it will be argued below that it is preferable for potential whistleblowers to utilise 'internal' procedures (including reference to an independent third party) for resolving concerns. If the use of these procedures is ineffective or if their use gives rise to recriminations, then the whistleblower should enjoy protection under relevant legislation. Furthermore, those who harm the interests of bona fide whistleblowers should be subject to penalties imposed under the law.
None of this is meant to resolve questions about the extent to which statutory whistleblower protection ought to extend to the private sector. Rather, the intention has been to draw attention to the direction in which the debate seems to be moving - and, in particular, to indicate that a general concern for the public's wellbeing, health and safety seems to be of growing importance.
Having said this, for most part the comments and observations which follow will be primarily concerned with issues confronting the public sector.
A preliminary overview
Seeking a definition
Whilst most of us understand the term 'whistleblower' at an intuitive level, it is interesting to note that the term has, for some time, received closer attention in enquiries and legislation in North America.
More recently, a similar desire to clarify the meaning of the term has been evident in documents originating in Australia such as Issues Paper No 10, 'Protection of Whistleblowers', as issued by the Queensland Electoral and Administrative Review Commission (EARC). Research such as this has done much to eliminate the pejorative overtones that have traditionally been associated with the term. These days a typical definition of a whistleblower will be akin to that used in the United States' renowned statute the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978. This Act defines a whistleblower as an employee:
... who discloses information he reasonably believes evidences a violation of any law, rule, or regulation, or mismanagement, a gross waste of public funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial or specific danger to public health or safety.
In an excellent and comprehensive article based on research funded by the Law Foundation of New South Wales, Starke (1991) reports that for general purposes, any definition of whistleblowing must include the following requirements:
- a disclosure of information evidencing objectionable misconduct, not otherwise known or visible;
- such disclosure is made in the reasonable belief that this information demonstrates that there had been such misconduct;
- the person making the disclosure acts in good faith, without malice;
- the disclosure is made in the public interest with a view to ensuring that the community has an effective civil service; and
- the disclosure is not specifically prohibited by law, or considerations of national security or defence would not preclude it being made.
(Starke, 1991, p.210)
In an attempt to be even more specific, McMillan (1988) identifies a number of elements which will provide the common stock for definitions being:
- The whistleblower: a current or past employee of an organisation who makes accusations against that organisation;
- The recipient of the complaint: commonly some external body (such as the media, Parliament, or a public enquiry) but sometimes also an internal recipient (such as a more senior officer, or a special internal office created to receive such complaints);
- The complaint: normally that an organisation has practised, tolerated or bears responsibility for some illegal, immoral or unethical conduct which is likely to result in unnecessary harm to third parties; and
- The circumstances of the disclosure: which usually occurs in a way whereby the whistleblower (either intentionally or accidentally) is identified publicly with the complaint, and claims that the principle motive for the disclosure was to advance the public interest.
(McMillan, 1988, p.119)
Having concluded a very general introduction to the topic, the following issues are discussed in the remainder of this paper:
- Establishing adequate reporting procedures
- Reducing the risk to whistleblowers
- The contradiction between expected loyalty and honesty
- Balancing obligations: individual, organisational and community
- Reacting to reports of wrongdoing
Establishing adequate reporting procedures
There are many concerns expressed about the activity of whistleblowing. However, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that much criticism is motivated by a reaction against what is seen to be a somewhat ad hoc approach to the reporting of unacceptable behaviour. Whistleblowers are frequently portrayed as well-meaning renegades, out of step with the majority in their concern to report wrongdoing.
One important way to alter such perceptions is to make the activity of reporting wrongdoing an integral part of the systems in place within an organisation. Indeed, this approach was specifically endorsed by the Senate Select Committee on Public Interest Whistleblowing recommending inter alia that:
... the internal reporting of wrongdoing should be actively promoted within organisations when the requisite procedures are in place to deal effectively with such allegations. (9.31)
(1994, p.xix)
Many organisations are familiar with the need to ensure that financial reporting is accurate, comprehensive and regular. New standards of disclosure in prospectuses and as more generally required under rules being established by bodies such as the Australian Securities Commission and the Australian Stock Exchange all help to create a climate of expectation concerning the degree to which the intra and extramural flow of information in and about organisations is to be channelled.
Having said this, it is to be recognised that there would seem to be a considerable difference between financial reporting and the kind of reporting envisaged in cases of whistleblowing. After all, it is easy to argue that financial reporting and regimes of continuous disclosure are prudent mechanisms designed to ensure the proper operation of markets. However, it is exactly this type of observation that helps to focus attention on questions to do with the whole basis for establishing a reporting system for whistleblowers to utilise.
In designing any system it is important to have a clear understanding of the purposes to be served by the network. Whilst it may be fairly easy to specify the objectives for such a system in terms of efficiency and so on, the whole character of the design and execution of the system will be affected by the type of understanding which exists concerning the ends which it is designed to serve.
For example, in the case of whistleblowing is the primary aim to report wrongdoing with a view to: prevention, the punishment of malefactors, the rehabilitation of malefactors, the saving of material resources, the preservation and promotion of a certain type of ethos and so on? Naturally enough, these options are not mutually exclusive. However, degrees of emphasis may affect the formal structure for a reporting network. For example, if the primary concern is to prevent wrongdoing (as opposed, say, to punish wrongdoers) then there may be a greater emphasis on the need to establish internal lines for reporting. In such a case, whistleblowing would come to be seen as a diagnostic process akin to other more established forms of internal self-monitoring.
In this regard it is interesting to note that a recent article, published in Fortune, noted that some 200 major US corporations "have recently appointed ethics officers, usually senior managers of long experience, to serve as ombudsmen and encourage whistleblowing".
At the same time, it is important to recognise that there are a number of special factors which may apply in a way such that an exclusive reliance on internal lines of communication is neither possible nor desirable. Some activities that need to be reported may involve criminal actions. The treatment of matters criminal is a public process.
At another level, it may be essential to supplement internal processes with an external framework. There may be extraordinary temptations which lead internal officers to ignore evidence of wrongdoing. For example, issues raised by whistleblowers may be perceived as a relatively unimportant distraction when compared with other more immediate organisational objectives. This may be especially so if the individuals concerned are, in all other respects, good at what they do. Then there are matters that can arise when personal relationships are compromised or when to act on a report would be inconvenient or against ones broader interests.
All of this leads to some tentative conclusions concerning the general shape of an adequate and effective reporting structure:
- The aims of the structure should be made explicit. If the objectives are properly understood and endorsed then there will be a much better chance of achieving the desired end,
- The structure should resemble other networks within the organisation. This will help to encourage a sense that reporting serious wrongdoing is a normal part of the organisation's culture,
- Whilst it may be desirable to have internal lines of communication, it is very important that there be an individual or unit whose chief (if not sole) responsibility is to handle the relevant reports. An adequate network must be headed by a person who has sufficient seniority to ensure that reports will be dealt with in an appropriate manner. Whistleblowers must have confidence in the internal system. Such confidence can easily be undermined if there is a perception that the responsible entity is subject to any form of 'operational' conflict of interest. This can happen when cost restraints mean that the responsible entity is required to fulfil a number of other duties which involve a blurring of lines of responsibility and so on,
- Given the difficulty of establishing entirely dependable lines of communication, it may be wise to sanction the use of external lines in circumstances where there are sufficient grounds for believing that the internal structure is inadequate.
Reducing the risk to whistleblowers
That which has been outlined above presupposes that potential whistleblowers are going to be confident enough to use a system of reporting (with or without an internal reporting component), as opposed to an ad hoc arrangement in which their interests may be better protected (albeit in a minimal way).
Such a presupposition can only be made if there is a guarantee of protection for those who come forward with information of wrongdoing. Whilst legislation to protect whistleblowers from retribution may not be sufficient it is nonetheless necessary if any framework for reporting is to be effective. As noted below, Professor Paul Finn has argued that the range of interests to be protected in cases of whistleblowing goes beyond those of the person making the report. Any system of legislation will need to acknowledge this broader range of interests.
Starke (1991) cites work done on the issue of whistleblowing by Professor Paul Finn, of the Australian National University, in his Working Paper entitled Secrecy, Dissent and Whistleblowing: A Reporting Scheme. As summarised by Starke these interests include:
- The interests of the person or persons impugned in the report or complaint.
- The interests of the reporter. Except where the reporter is a senior/supervising officer performing a duty to export the misconduct of subordinates,
it is desirable that the anonymity of the reporter be maintained until that point is reached in consequential investigation where revelation of the reporter's identity is necessary (if at all) so as to accord due process to 'the accused'.
- The interests of the agency. Here there is a need to minimise the disruption occasioned by the report.
- The interests of the public
(Starke, 1991, p.256)
The need to recognise a variety of interests is especially important when it is realised that whistleblowing activities do not always result in overly beneficial results.
As Neilsen (1989) has observed, when describing what he terms "forcing strategies", there are a number of risks and limitations that may affect the outcome. Ryan (1991) summarises the factors thus:
The individual who is taking action may have insufficient information or experience. Sound co-operative relationships in the organisation can be unduly damaged ... "using force can contribute to an atmosphere or belief culture that the only way to get things done is through force' - a prescription for chronic distrust and tension
As noted above, it would be a mistake to think that whistleblowing, as a "forcing strategy", exhausts the opportunities for making an appropriate response to wrongdoing.
Some general considerations
Much of the above assumes that there will be some sort of internal system of reporting. It remains to be said that this need not be so. Bodies such as the Independent Commission Against Corruption in New South Wales, the Queensland Criminal Justice Commission and the Office of Special Counsel in the United States all provide initial points of contact and have 'original' jurisdiction in the investigation of relevant reports of wrongdoing.
That is, reports can be made to such bodies without recourse to any internal mechanisms for handling such issues.
It is important to realise that internal and external lines of communication in these matters can and should be mutually reinforcing. Internal conflicts and other such matters can hamper the effectiveness of internal structures. Hence the importance of having an entirely independent body with the powers sufficient to command confidence. However, exclusive reliance on an external body may inadvertently lead to a reinforcement of prejudices concerning the status of whistleblowers. That is, reporting wrongdoing will fail to be seen as a 'diagnostic' tool that is applied within organisations.
This is to suggest that the ideal framework is likely to include a combination of internal and external reporting regimes. However, this state of affairs will necessitate the creation of guidelines that help to differentiate between circumstances when it is appropriate to utilise internal mechanisms and those when recourse should be had to an external agency. It will not be possible in this paper to outline the kinds of considerations that may apply.
Over and above considerations pertaining to whether or not one should utilise internal or external reporting lines are those pertaining to whether or not the whistleblower should 'go public'. There would seem to be a consensus of opinion that in circumstances where public exposure can be justified by an overwhelming and immediate concern for the public interest, such as when public safety may be at risk or when there is no other alternative.
This is also to recognise that a free and responsible media has an important role to play in uncovering and reporting on wrongdoing. This may be especially so in cases involving the public sector. However, it is also fair to say that informed opinion would place the onus on the whistleblower to justify 'going public' when reasonable alternatives for reporting were available.
Professor Paul Finn may have taken such considerations into account when framing his recommendations concerning the types of protection to be afforded to public sector whistleblowers that 'go public':
- Notwithstanding any duty of secrecy to the contrary, it should be lawful for a public officer or employee or an officer or employee of a state owned company:
- to make a (confidential?) report to a parliamentary committee of any matter which could have been reported 'in-house' or to an independent agency ... ;
- where that parliamentary committee has undertaken an inquiry into a matter in relation to which that report would be a relevant consideration.
- A reporter who fails to or refuses to avail of established reporting procedures but who 'goes public", will nonetheless be entitled to the protection of anti-reprisal procedures including immunity from criminal prosecution if, and only if, that person can show
- that he or she had reasonable grounds for believing that the report made was true;
- that the allegation has been found to be substantially accurate in the event; and
- that notwithstanding his or her failure to avail of established procedures, the course taken was excusable in the circumstances.
(Finn, 1990, p.24)
In general, it can be seen how these provisions might apply in an environment where limited protection has been extended to people working in the private sector. A concern for the truth of what is disclosed will apply in all circumstances - as will a need to ensure that disclosures are neither malicious, careless nor vexatious.
Should there be a duty to report wrongdoing?
Finally there is the question of whether or not there should be a positive duty to report wrongdoing. It may be worth noting that many corporations have now introduced Codes of Business Conduct. The Code of one such company, Coca-Cola Amatil has the following provisions:
Each employee shall be alert to any action or omission in connection with his or her work which might constitute a violation of this Code, shall attempt to prevent Code violations and shall take prompt corrective action necessary to remedy and prevent any recurring violation of this Code. Where personal corrective action is not possible or practicable, the employee should immediately bring the matter to the attention of his or her supervisor, the functional Executive Director or the Managing Director.
It goes on:
Any failure by an employee to report a Code violation in accordance with this Code section shall itself constitute a Code violation.
(Coca-Cola Amatil, 1991, pp 20 & 22)
In a similar fashion, legislative provisions such as section 11 of the Independent Commission Against Corruption Act (NSW) impose duties on certain officers to report incidences of suspected corruption.
Whether or not one looks to a formal legal framework for establishing the grounds for reporting misconduct or rely on internal codes, there seems to be acceptance of the principle that serious cases of wrongdoing should be brought to the attention of those who can rectify the situation.
That there is a prima facie duty to report such behaviour is evidenced by a long tradition, stretching back to at least medieval times, which recognises a degree of mutual responsibility for that which our compatriots do. Whether it be in the offence of misprision of felony or in a more general sense of culpability, there remains a sense that there is something fundamentally unjust about a situation in which silence leads to success for the guilty.
Of course, part of the solution to this problem involves a recognition of the fact that silence can be the child of many fathers. Fear of the consequences can breed silence. Confusion as to the proper course of action can be a similar dampener to action. However, it is especially important to realise that in many cases silence is the result of a general feeling that the type of behaviour considered to be wrong by some is, in fact, perfectly acceptable. It is not that people holding such views have an underdeveloped moral sense.
Rather, it can be that the weight of custom and practice blinds them to what would otherwise be a straightforward assessment of wrong behaviour. Such custom and practice is formed by habits of lifetimes and sometimes of generations. The illusion that 'everybody' does it, or that 'it's harmless' or that 'he's a good bloke' obscures the fact that willing silence often allows the continuation of a situation that ultimately harms the innocent as well as the guilty.
The contradiction between expected loyalty and honesty and balancing obligations
It is sometimes suggested that there is a conflict between loyalty and honesty. Looked at in one type of light this would seem to be true. Loyalty amongst conspirators and thieves may be a valued commodity.
However, to speak in such terms is precisely to expose the fact that 'loyalty' based on a preference for self-serving dishonest behaviour is a pale imitation of the real thing. It is a soiled brand. Loyalty depends on a capacity to trust one another. Trust cannot be founded on the shifting sand of lies and dishonest behaviour.
Beyond this, we have an intuitive sense that loyalty is something owed to a deserving object. Even where loyalty is thought to be owed to an office (such as a commander-in-chief of the armed forces) there is provision made for circumstances where the individual holding that office is corrupt. The power of impeachment represents a recognition of the fact that an office can be demeaned by its holder.
Loyalty cannot afford to be blind any more than people can afford to remain silent in the face of wrongdoing. Here in Australia the dobber has been especially reviled. Those who dob are thought to have betrayed the canons of ‘mateship’. Such views are anathema to the true ideal of ‘mateship’. This ideal was born out of the necessity of relying on one another in difficult circumstances.
There is no injunction stating that a person should tolerate the parasitical behaviour of the corrupt. A true mate would never place a friend in jeopardy simply for the sake of securing some selfish objective. The ideal of mateship arose in a context where small bands of individuals formed small societies based on the principles of mutual and self help. It is something of a pity that the ideal has been debased as society has grown in size and complexity.
Loyalty often demands the exercise of courage. Such courage may need to be manifested in the form of moral courage. In turn this may involve a decision to promote honesty as a true test of loyalty to those who deserve its application. As noted above, whistleblowing does not have to be part of a scheme of retribution against miscreants. Whistleblowing is as much about society, in its various forms, protecting itself from avoidable harm. It is also one part of a chain of actions that may lead dishonest individuals to recognise the harm that they do to others and ultimately to themselves.
The chief point to be realised in all of this is that the phenomenon of whistleblowing is representative of peoples' reaction to complex social problems that require equally complex and integrated responses. The type of response to be made will be guided by policies and attitudes concerning the relative seriousness of different forms of wrongdoing. A general climate of opinion is likely to affect the tenor of specific responses. Hence, it is important that clear standards be established to govern the appropriate response to reports of wrongdoing.
Whilst there can be no guarantees in such matters, it is likely that schemes for the protection of whistleblowers will be enhanced if seen as being part of a wider concern that looks to the welfare of all concerned. The strength of Paul Finn's comprehensive list of interests lies in the fact that collateral effects are taken into account.
The wisdom of this approach has been recognised in the practice of the Department of Defence which has been pioneering responses to issues of fraud ethics and accountability as part of its awareness campaign. It is significant that the Department has taken a special interest in the need to assist people who have suffered incidental or direct harm as a result of an investigation (in all its various phases).
Reacting to reports of wrongdoing
A concern for the wellbeing of all concerned will lead to certain tendencies being evident in the response to reports of wrongdoing. As indicated above, such a response will have the following characteristics:
- the response will be objective,
- any investigation will be thorough while seeking to minimise delay in the resolution of the matter,
- where possible, procedures employed will be non-coercive and non-threatening.
There are bound to be other factors that could be drawn from the discussion so far. To the extent that any other matter should be considered, it will owe its place in the discussion to the fact that it contributes to the achievement of a just solution. That is, to a solution that is fair to all concerned.
Conclusion
Ultimately, our attitude to whistleblowers will depend on the broad ethical framework applying within the community at large and, more specifically, within the multi-faceted world of work. Hence the importance of the Senate Committee's recommendation that there be a:
... significant national education campaign directed at changing corporate and official attitudes towards whistleblowing at all levels within the organisation - both public and private, and within the community generally, should be undertaken as a matter of priority. (para 6.35)
(1994, p.xiv)
There is no denying that whistleblowers face a dilemma in determining whether or not to draw attention to matters which so trouble their consciences that they feel bound to expose themselves and others to censure. From one point of view whistleblowing might be regarded as evidence of failure.
On such an account the finger of blame could point in many directions: at organisations which have tolerated intolerable behaviour; at individuals who have put private advantage above the interests of all others, to whole groups of people whose custom and practice have left them blind to corruption and to others who, through apathy, fear, prudence or whatever have failed to accept responsibility for saying no to harmful attitudes and behaviour.
Yet, at another level, whistleblowing may be seen as a triumph of unsettling proportions. It is, perhaps. a little startling to see people willing to risk opprobrium by following the dictates of their consciences. It is even more unsettling to realise that they are motivated by values to which we subscribe, albeit in private.
The challenge is to erect structures that allow light to penetrate the veil of corruption. Such a structure will need to build using existing resources such as: the common law, various codes affecting the professions, the media and so on. However, the foundation will have to be a general feeling, within the community, that various corrupt practices must be stopped because they are wrong.
People are starting to realise that unethical behaviour causes harm not only at the level of the hip-pocket nerve. They are also coming to see that a corrupt society is harmed in less obvious but nonetheless tangible respects. All of this may lead to a growing sense that integrity should be 'rewarded' with something other and better than a ruined life.
References:
1. Coca-Cola Amatil, (1991), Code of Business Conduct.
2. EARC, (1990), 'Protection of Whistleblowers' in Issues Papers, No. 10, , December 1990
3. Finn, PD (1990) Working Paper V, 'Secrecy, Dissent and Whistleblowing: A Reporting Scheme', Fitzgerald Report
4. McMillan, J, (1988), 'Blowing the Whistle on Fraud in Government', Canberra Bulletin of Public Administration, No 56, September 1988, 118-123
5. Neilsen, RP (1989), 'Negotiating as an Ethics Action (Praxis) Strategy' in Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 8, No. 5, pp. 383-390
6. Ryan, MH (1991), 'The Manager in the organisational web' in City Ethics, issue 5, spring 1991, pp. 4-5.
7. Senate Select Committee on Public Interest Whistleblowing, (1994), In the Public Interest, Canberra, Senate Printing Unit, Commonwealth of Australia
8. Starke, JG, (1991), 'The Protection of Public Service 'Whistleblowers' - Part 1' in The Australian Law Journal, Vol 65, No 4, April 1991, pp 205-219
9. Starke, JG, (1991), "The Protection of Public Service 'Whistleblowers' - Part 2' in The Australian Law Journal, Vol 65, No 5, May 1991, pp 252-265
Dr Simon Longstaff is Executive Director of St James Ethics Centre.
A version of this article was first published in 1995.
© St James Ethics Centre
