No, you certainly did say that it was fruitless to define "ethics", "virtue", "justice" and the like, meaning that no specific meaning could be given to any of them, and that you expected ambiguity and vagueness, and that they could not be applied to "real world" circumstances, which means that if you try and discuss ethics, virtue, justice and so forth with me, you can only ever expect me to understand vaguely something that is ambiguous and to which you attach no specific meaning, and which has no good relationship to the "real world".

So when you ask about ethics, you're saying "Here's a vague, ambiguous thing to which I cannot attach a specific meaning, cannot qualify, and which I cannot relate to the "real world" although I find it imperative that if we speak about it we relate it to "real" circumstances, please answer a question about it", call any circumstances you want "ethical" or applicable to "ethics" and yet do not reveal why you believe the word "ethics" could be attached to these situations, and expect people to know what the discussion is really about.

Well, if this is your initial premise, then yes it is impossible to expect to (a) have people understand you, except in general head-nodding or head shaking, or (b) understand anybody else, except in the same manner. When you cannot clarify the meaning of the major word in your question, in fact, when you point to quotes saying that it is fruitless to define, then you make it impossible to communicate through language.

No, I believe I noted I found defining words like these to be fruitless. And yes I do. And after many, many years of trying. But I would then note in turn this did not make defining them necessarily fruitless. If your definitions work for you, fine.

But I can't imagine broaching and then defining ethics didactically without at the same time imagining this definition being used in a discussion regarding actual behaviors in conflict. Otherwise, what is the point of defining it at all? And all I can do is take any definitions I come upon in exchanges like this and situate them out in the world. In fact, out in the world of actual human interaction is the only place that ethics is of interest to me.

To say, in relation to ethics, that one’s principal concern is not reference to definitions but rather how one acts in the world when confronted with its perplexing, changing and complex situations is prima facie unexceptionable. To suppose on the other hand that there is no definitionally-saturated cognitive accompaniment to an action, composed of unarticulated memories and the salient features of the situation, is disingenuous. What one may be substituting for an explicit definition, of either a descriptive or prescriptive nature, is, ostensibly, an implicit motivational reference point which effectively constitutes a pragmatic and labile ‘definition’ relevant to the circumstances.

However, if accounts emerging from the fields of cognitive science, experimental psychology and neuroscience of motivation for ethically-flavoured action are somewhere near correct, the kind of intuitive and generally unreflective motivational situation I’ve roughly described is characteristic of most such action, and specific reference to explicitly defined ethical standards, prescriptions, and so forth, features largely in the ex-post facto explanations or justifications we offer to ourselves or to others.

I wish to raise 3 major and 1 minor objection to the claim that a creator god could be the source of an objective morality.

The first objection that I wish to raise is as follows: From the above definition of objective morality, we note that the truth-value of a claim must be dependent upon the object of inquiry, not the subject. However, fundamentally, this cannot be the case if divine creation (that is to say, creation by a creator god) obtains, given that this requires that the truth-value of a moral claim must be fundamentally independent of the object of inquiry.

But, if the truth-value of a moral claim is fundamentally independent of the object of inquiry, then it is impossible to come to an objective conclusion regarding a moral claim. Any attempts at finding the objective truth of a moral claim will fail, at best resulting in a subjective answer. Thus, given this fundamental disconnect, it is clear that a creator god cannot provide an objective moral system through objective inquiry.

The second objection that I wish to raise is that it is also the case that no objective justification external to an object can be given, since any choice must be arbitrary and fundamentally subjective. This stems from the requirements of divine creation, namely that everything must be contingent upon the will of the creator god, therefore there can be no pre-existing principles upon which to ground a choice. Thus, even if a justification is given for a choice of moral values, it must ultimately be reducible to arbitrary, and subjective, choices made by the creator god.

Thirdly, one might argue that the creator god can create objective morality by fiat, regardless of the lack of an objective foundation. However, even here we face a problem. The notion that a creator god can create objective morality by fiat is in itself a moral principle. However this cannot then be justified without either refuting divine creation (if we for instance presuppose a pre-existing moral principle), or by making a circular argument. Therefore, we must conclude that a creator god cannot provide an objective morality by fiat.

And finally, a point which does not directly establish that the existence of a creator god presupposes the non-existence of objective morality, but which I consider it relevant none the less: Even if we accept the possibility that a creator god might be the source of a objective moral system, it still follows that there can be no justification for expecting such a moral system, indeed any moral system from a creator god, given that the choice of whenever or not to create such a system would be based upon a foundation of equally arbitrary choices.