WikiLeaks: a force for good?

By Simon Longstaff

This article was published in Living Ethics: issue 84 winter 2011

The June 2011 Intelligence Squared debate which is now available at iq2oz.com pondered the proposition WikiLeaks is a force for good. Speakers for: Dr Suelette Dreyfus, Kristinn Hrafnsson, current spokesman for WikiLeaks, Professor Stuart Rees. Speakers against: Gareth Evans, Dr Michael Fullilove, Tom Switzer.

Speaking at the 25th Asia Pacific Roundtable in Kuala Lumpur in June 2011, Rowan Callick (The Australian) quoted Australia’s Ambassador to the United States, Kim Beazley, who stated “[WikiLeaks is] like American foreign policy being neutron bombed” – the implication being that while the infrastructure of the US State Department survives, the people within the edifice have been badly damaged. Beazley’s analogy is, at the very least, striking. It is also at the more extreme end of the rhetorical scale employed by WikiLeaks’ critics. The core of Kim Beazley’s argument, however, is shared by many members of the diplomatic community. Their chief complaint is that WikiLeaks has undermined a fundamental precursor for the conduct of diplomacy – the maintenance of confidentiality of communications. The argument goes that, without a guarantee of confidentiality, the otherwise essential exchange of information will be curtailed for fear of exposure. Given that effective diplomacy can prevent or resolve conflicts capable of destroying the lives of innocent people, it is further posited that WikiLeaks is a significant source of harm – and not just a minor inconvenience.

It should be noted that this argument does not rely on the claim that WikiLeaks’ release of cables caused serious harm to those named in the published cables. Appearing before Congress, US Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, testified that no damage had been done to active operations and that no American life had been put at risk by the activities of WikiLeaks. The fate of those who provided information to US officials, however, may not have been so benign – especially if operating under oppressive regimes in countries where even a modest degree of candour can have dire consequences for the individuals concerned.

At face value the criticism mounted by Beazley and those of like mind would seem to have merit. After all, who would deny that effective diplomacy is an important public good. It is less clear, however, that WikiLeaks acted in a manner to undermine the preconditions for diplomacy. For example, although diplomats require some matters to be kept secret, it does not follow that all matters they claim require secrecy should be accorded this same condition. The scope of the Official Secrets Act in Britain was once so expansive that it included the House of Commons’ dining room menu. No reasonable person would assume secrecy requirements for such details. In fact, much included in the trove of diplomatic cables released by WikiLeaks was mundane. Indeed, the level of American security accorded to the cables was relatively low – with access granted to several million people connected to the Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNet) used to share information in the ‘war on terror’. It is unlikely the United States Government would have granted such extensive access if it had considered the cables contained highly sensitive information.

The other point worth noting about the contentious releases is that WikiLeaks subjected itself to external review by agreeing that the editors of mainstream news outlets should vet the material in order to remove any information judged to be genuinely sensitive. This is an important point.

In the case of the US cables, at least, WikiLeaks was prepared to accept the judgement of editors who society routinely trusts to be prudent and responsible when determining what should or should not be published. The editors involved in handling the sensitive diplomatic material have been explicit about their determination to exclude material that would have caused risk, rather than mere embarrassment, to others.

As most commentators have noted, the debate about WikiLeaks is about much more than the particular case of how the US diplomatic cables were handled. The larger question concerns the extent to which society should have access to public information that is relevant to its interests. There is a significant difference, however, between what is in the public interest and what the public happens to be interested in – a distinction not always applied by the media. Governments often claim to be guardians of the public interest. They claim a corresponding right to decide what the public should know – and when we should know it. It is also clear, however, that governments will often make decisions in line with personal or political interests – interests that are not always aligned with those of their citizens. Add to this the kind of caution that would include a dining room menu under an official secrets act and it soon becomes evident that it would be unwise to rely exclusively on the judgement of governments.

The vast majority of people recognise the importance of maintaining some measure of secrecy in their own lives. They also know governments must keep some matters secret, for example for reasons of national security. What WikiLeaks has prompted is a public discussion about where the balance should lie.